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Abstract
We model normal-quadratic social learning with agents who observe a summary statistic over
past actions, rather than complete action histories. Because an agent with a summary statistic
cannot correct for the fact that earlier actions influenced later ones, even a small presence of old
actions in the statistic can introduce very persistent errors. Depending on how fast these old
actions fade from view, social learning can either be as fast as if agents’ private information were
pooled (rate n) or it can slow to a crawl (rate lnn). We also examine extensions to learning
from samples of actions, learning about a moving target, heterogeneous preferences, and biases
toward own information.
1 Introduction
We introduce a model of social learning in which people learn from statistics over other people’s
past actions. In the baseline model, this statistic is an average over a large pool of past actions;
one could think of it as some kind of macroeconomic indicator. In a variation, the statistic is an
average over a small, idiosyncratic sample of actions; one could think of this as word of mouth
learning. The key feature in both cases is that the signal summarizes history: context about the
sequence of individual past actions is lost. This lack of context is costly because it prevents people
from unraveling interdependencies among past actions generated by social learning in the past. Our
main aims in the paper are to show that this typically creates a bias toward old information, and
to study how this bias aﬀects the speed of learning.1
The baseline model PA (for population average) builds on Vives [19]. A new cohort of agents
arrives at each stage (1, 2, ..., n, ... and so on) and must choose an action once and for all in order
to minimize a quadratic loss function. The common optimal action θ is unknown, but each agent
receives a private signal, normally distributed around θ, and an observational signal based on prior
agents’ behavior. After acting the agent passes into an observation pool: this is a collection of agents
1Herding on a sub-optimal action is not a possibility in our model; the continuous action space ensures that learning
always continues and beliefs eventually converge to the truth. However there are natural comparisons between the
mechanisms that cause slow learning in our model and the factors that stop learning in herding models — we touch on
these later in this section.
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whose actions remain visible or on display, in a sense that we clarify momentarily. Agents who are
already in the pool exit from it at some rate; this is a shorthand way to say that their actions
no longer contribute to observations by future agents. The observational signal that an agent sees
before deciding is the mean action in this pool. The only diﬀerence in the sample average (SA)
variation of the model is that each agent sees the mean of a random sample of actions drawn from
the observation pool, rather than the average over the whole pool.
For the baseline model, the observation pool can be interpreted as the set of past actors who
contribute to some aggregate measurement. To illustrate, imagine that new cohorts of youths
arrive periodically and make decisions about how much education to acquire. Each of them can
see a statistic on the average educational attainment of adults in the labor force. In this case,
the observation pool — the labor force — reflects the past education choices of people who are still
working. Because older people are more likely to have left the labor force, the observational signal
is (to a first approximation) a recency-weighted average of past choices.2 As a second example,
suppose that most people begin to save seriously for retirement around age forty, make once-and-
for-all decisions about a savings rate, and agree that aiming for a 70% ratio of retirement income
to current income is desirable.3 The savings rate needed to hit this goal is uncertain, but people
can see a government statistic on the average savings rate among 40-50 year olds. In this case, the
observation pool consists largely of decisions that are one to ten years old, but there may be some
older decisions as well. To illustrate a case where the “statistic” is less literal, consider a small
farmer in a developing country whose village has adopted a new crop. In deciding how heavily to
irrigate his field he may look at the level of the local reservoir to get an indication of the average
water use by farmers who planted earlier than him. The observation pool model is well suited to
other situations where people see a blend of recent and older actions; by varying the rate at which
old actions exit out of the pool, one can give the decisionmaker an average of all past actions, or
only the most recent ones, or a recency-weighted blend.
The sample average model describes settings where no comprehensive public statistic is available,
and people collect a few examples to guide their decisions. For example, a new employee organizing
her retirement plan may ask a few of her co-workers about the stock-bond allocations they chose,
or a sprinter interested in optimizing his diet may browse a few web sites to see the protein-to-
carbohydrate ratios that other athletes mention. In each case the observation pool of actions that
are available to sample may be tilted toward recent ones — co-workers of longer tenure at the firm
retire or quit, and older websites may eventually be updated or taken down. To apply model SA
to examples like these, we need two additional criteria to hold. First, the decisionmaker has poor
contextual information about exactly when her samplees acted and what observations they had
access to at the time. This would be true if the employee does not know exactly when her co-
2Of course, other factors besides age can aﬀect the set of predecessors that is available to observe. Selection of the
observational signal along non-age dimensions creates additional interesting issues for social learning, but we will not
tackle those issues here.
3Of course, the savings rate is not really a once-and-for-all decision, but there is considerable evidence (e.g. Duflo
and Saez [9]) that people do not revise their retirement plans very often.
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workers were hired, or if the athlete’s web sites are undated and lack references.4 Loosely, we may
say that the decisionmaker has no way to distinguish one sampled action from another.5 Second,
the way the decisionmaker handles context-free actions is to treat them all equally.6 Under these
assumptions, the best estimate of θ that the decisionmaker can form from her sample will be the
sample average. By assuming that the decisionmaker simply observes this sample average directly,
model SA stylizes the idea of observing individual but context-free actions.
Learning is measured by the precision of agents’ estimates of θ, or inversely by the squared error
in their actions. As a benchmark, if agents’ private signals were simply published as soon as they
arrived, then action precision would grow at rate n (where n is the number of cohorts that have
arrived); we call this the full-information rate of learning, or fast learning. Our main results for
model PA (Proposition 2) and SA (Proposition 6) show that social learning proceeds at the log of the
rate at which old actions exit from the observation pool.7 If old actions exit at least exponentially
— that is, if no more than e−k of a cohort’s actions remain in the pool k periods after that cohort
acted — then learning is fast. If old actions exit only polynomially (e.g., only k−a actions remain k
periods later) then learning slows to the log of the full-information rate. This is exceedingly slow:
not before roughly en cohorts have acted will public information be as good as it would have been
if the first n cohorts had published their signals.
To illustrate the bias that gives rise to slow learning, suppose that old actions never die in model
PA, so each agent observes the equally weighted average of all past actions. Write x1, x2, x3, ... for
the average action of agents in cohorts 1, 2, 3, and so on. Consider all of the channels through which
private information held by the cohort 1 agents becomes impounded in the observational signal seen
at stage n+1. Action x1 appears in its own right, but it also transmits influence indirectly through
its eﬀect on x2, the eﬀect of both x1 and x2 on x3, and so on. In this way, the indirect influence
of an old action can come to dwarf its direct contribution to the summary statistic. Fast social
learning requires old actions to be purged fast enough to counter not just their direct influence, but
also this compounding indirect influence. To measure the bias toward old information, we calculate
the fraction of the squared error in the observational signal that can be attributed to idiosyncratic
4This issue has received considerable scrutiny in the medical community in the context of studies about the quality
of online medical information. In one meta-study covering up to 1300 websites [12], researchers found that 58% to
83% of information sources failed to report even minimal information about how current their content was (such as
when the site was created or last updated).
5 In reality, the employee probably has some inkling about the order of her co-workers’ decisions. But the main
reason that the order of decisions is important for inference is that she must be able to assess who her co-worker could
have relied on for advice, and who might have relied on him. This information may be much murkier to her.
6Two notes. First, since actions will turn out to be normally distributed about θ, an optimal estimate based on
past actions will always be a linear combination with some weights. By “treat equally,” we mean the weights must be
equal, and this leads to the sample average.
Second, demanding that an agent treat unordered actions equally is not an innocuous constraint. A statistically
clever agent should try to find clues to the order of the actions in the way they are grouped (that is, which ones
are most similar or least similar to each other), and treating actions diﬀerently based on these clues should improve
the estimate of θ. However, this type of analysis appears terrifically complicated — one must estimate not just when
predecessors acted, but also what they believed about when their own predecessors acted, and so on. Assuming equal
treatment amounts to an assumption that agents are not this clever.
7Propositions 2 and 6 are actually cast in terms of the rate at which the observation pool grows, which is negatively
related to how fast old actions die out. The more intuitive explanation here follows Corollary 1.
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error in each prior private signal (Proposition 3). If the observation pool aggregated information
eﬃciently, then the share of this error due to any single signal would tend to zero over time. However,
when old agents disappear from the observation pool slowly (sub-exponentially), the idiosyncratic
error they introduce becomes locked in, as a fraction of total error. In one example, the error in the
signals of the very first cohort to act is responsible for at least 82% of the error of every subsequent
agent, no matter how far into the future! An agent in the model understands that she is facing
an echo chamber — from her point of view, her recent predecessors have parroted the same old
information too much and relied on their new private signals too little. But to correct this problem,
she would need to be able to trace the chain of dependencies from one action to the next, and her
information is not rich enough to let her do this. This also helps to account for the similar results in
the population average and sample average models; because errors in actions quickly become highly
correlated (Proposition 5), larger samples are not much more informative than small ones.
In many practical settings, people’s optimal actions will be similar but not necessarily identical.
For example, the optimal level of schooling for a particular student may depend on her aptitude,
finances, and so forth. Thus we extend model PA to allow for heterogeneity: each individual’s
private signal is now centered on her personal best action, which diﬀers from θ by a relative taste
shock (her ‘type’). If agents know their relative types (such as a student who understands how
smart she is relative to her classmates), the prior results still apply; each agent just adjusts her
best estimate of θ by the taste shock. However, if an agent does not know her type, she must rely
relatively heavily on her private signal (since this is her only personalized information). In this case,
heterogeneity induces a bias toward recent information, and so the persistence of old actions in the
observation pool, by creating a countervailing bias, can actually be helpful rather than pernicious
(Proposition 7). The logic of the recency bias begins by noting that an agent now views all of her
predecessors as having over-relied on their private signals, since their taste shocks are not relevant
to her. However, it is her recent predecessors whose over-reliance is most egregious to her, since
these agents saw relatively better observational signals of θ to which (in her view) they should have
deferred much more than they did.
While we have focused on social learning about a fixed parameter θ, in many settings the target
of learning might be changing over time. To study this case, we extend the model to allow θ to drift
according to a random walk. Not surprisingly, this intensifies the harm done by old actions in the
observation pool, as those actions are now not only too influential, but also out of date. In fact, we
show that if old actions do not exit at least exponentially fast, then the observational signal becomes
worthless: its precision tends to zero, and agents rely entirely on their private signals (Proposition
9).
All of our analysis relies on a uniform exit assumption. In eﬀect, this says that while the
contributions of two old cohorts to the observational signal may decline at any rate one likes, their
weights relative to each other do not change over time. Uniform exit buys a great deal of tractability
— it gives the learning dynamics a recursive characterization — but it has no deep justification. In
general under non-uniform exit the state space of the learning dynamics explodes, making analysis
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very diﬃcult, but we provide examples illustrating that a small chance of observing an arbitrarily
old action can suﬃce to slow down learning. One of these is rather striking: suppose that only
actions in the very first cohort have any persistence, perhaps due to some first-mover prominence;
otherwise the observational signal is focused on the most recent actions. Furthermore, let the weight
on the first-movers in the observational signal tend to zero over time. Unless that weight tends to
zero fast enough, the long run rate of social learning will still be slow.
Much of the existing literature on sequential observational learning, following Banerjee [3] and
Bikchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch [5], has focused on herding. In this literature, as in our paper,
an agent uses two sources of information to make a decision: first, some private information and
second, her observations about how other agents have acted in similar decision problems.8 It is well
understood that this generates an externality — an agent does not account for the fact that future
agents will tend to be more interested in her exclusive private information than in her observational
information (which they may be able to duplicate), thus she places too little weight on her private
information when she acts. Still, this would not cause a problem for future agents if they were able
to perfectly invert her action, thus recovering her private signal. The central insight of the herding
literature is that if actions are imperfectly invertible, then this externality can slow down learning
or even drive it to a halt. In many of the classic herding papers, this non-invertibility arises because
the action space has lower dimension (often the action is binary) than posterior beliefs. With rare
exceptions, this literature treats the full sequence of actions as observable in order to focus on the
challenge of recovering beliefs from actions.
In a similar vein, Vives [19] assumes that the full sequence of actions is observed, but that each
action is observed with noise, so once again beliefs cannot be perfectly recovered from actions. He
shows that the rate of learning slows to n
1
3 . Our model is very similar, but the only source of noise is
the conflation of early and late actions — we show that this can be an even more severe impediment
to learning.
Our paper is not the first to dispense with the assumption that the sequence of past actions
is perfectly observed. Ellison and Fudenberg [10], [11] and Banerjee and Fudenberg [4] introduce
models in which agents learn from aggregate statistics about samples of past actions (or outcomes).
Because these models all give agents a binary action choice, their focus is necessarily on whether,
rather than how quickly, complete learning is achieved. Like us, Smith and Sorensen [17] show the
desirability of a sampling scheme that favors recent actions, but their results are also on whether
learning is achieved, not its speed. Çelen and Kariv [7] revisit the binary action, sequential model
under the extreme assumption that only the most recent action is observed. They find that while
herding is never permanent (as it would be with perfectly observed histories), longer and longer spells
of herding occur as time goes on. This highlights an important diﬀerence between models with and
without an invertible mapping from beliefs to actions — in our model, when everyone observes her
immediate predecessor, that observation is suﬃcient for the predecessor’s belief, and learning is at
8Actually, one could imagine many decision outcomes that could be observed instead of, or in addition to, actions.
As the informational issues are similar regardless of which outcome variable is observed, we follow most of the literature
in focusing on observable actions.
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the full information rate. In an influential paper, Smith and Sorensen [16] showed among other
results that complete learning is achieved with finite actions if at least some agents have private
signals that are arbitrarily precise. They point out that a contrarian action is extremely influential
for later agents precisely because the contrarian must have been quite sure of herself to have deviated
from the herd. Callander and Hörner [6] demonstrate that this intuition can apply even when an
agent observes only the total number of choices of each type, rather than the full action sequence.
They develop conditions under which later agents optimally tilt toward the minority, rather than
the majority action.
Another branch of the literature, launched by Bala and Goyal [2], assumes that agents observe
each other according to a social network, typically represented by a graph. Bala and Goyal show
that if the network structure makes particular agents too influential, lock-in on the wrong action can
occur. In DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel [8], the network represents a channel for agents to share
beliefs (rather than observe actions or outcomes) with each other. With complete information about
the network structure, each agent faces a very challenging inference problem: she must understand
exactly who learned what from whom in order to correct for correlation and redundancy in neighbors’
beliefs. If agents use simpler inference heuristics, then the information of well-connected individuals
tends to accumulate too much weight. Our paper shares with both of these the intuition that
“over-observation” of a particular set of agents impedes learning, but in our case it is early actors
rather than well-connected ones who are observed disproportionately often. Finally, Acemoglu,
Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar [1] develop very general conditions on the network topology under
which complete learning is attained. Our objective is complementary to all of these papers; in our
model, complete learning occurs in the limit, and our focus is on how long this takes. The question
is a very practical one because rate n and rate lnn learning are very diﬀerent animals — the latter
may resemble incomplete learning over any reasonable time horizon.
Finally from a technical point of view, assuming the full sequence of past actions to be perfectly
observed has the advantage of permitting a compact, recursive representation of the learning dy-
namics. (This is its main appeal, since it is a heroic assumption for most practical applications.)
The sequence of observations then constitutes a filtration, the most recent observation suﬃces as a
state variable (since it is suﬃcient for all public information), and powerful tools like the Martin-
gale Convergence Theorem can be brought into service. Our uniform exit assumption allows us to
retain the tractability of a recursive model without requiring agents to have unrealistically detailed
information about the past. Extensions to the model that preserve this recursive structure and
avoid adding more state variables are relatively easily handled; we have discussed a few, but one
can imagine many others. Extensions that bring in additional state variables are more challenging;
a comparison of the proofs for models PA (one state variable) and SA (two) will give a sense of the
additional complications.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 introduces our baseline model (PA),
while Section 3 characterizes the speed of learning and the persistence of old information. Section
4 develops the results for model SA. Section 5 develops extensions, including heterogeneous tastes
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and the moving target. Section 6 examines examples that relax the uniform exit assumption, while
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
There is an infinite sequence of cohorts, each consisting of a unit measure of agents, that arrive at
stages {1, 2, ..., n, ...}. The agents in each cohort are identical, in the sense that they face the same
decision and share the same utility function, so we focus on the decision problem of a representative
agent from cohort n. To minimize ambiguous pronouns, we usually keep the convention that an
agent whose decision being examined is female while her predecessors are male.9 At stage 0, Nature
chooses once-and-for-all a value for θ ∈ <, the parameter that the agents will try to estimate.
Agents’ priors on θ are diﬀuse.10 At stage n, agent ni arrives (for i ∈ [0, 1]), observes information
Ini , and then chooses an action xni to minimize the quadratic loss function
E((xni − θ)2 | Ini)
The information set Ini = {sni , oni} contains two elements: an individual signal sni , and an obser-
vation oni about past agents’ actions. The individual signal is given by sni = θ + εn + εni , where
εn ∼ N(0, vc) is i.i.d. across cohorts and εni ∼ N(0, vind) is i.i.d. across individuals and cohorts.
The cohort error captures the possibility that a common factor aﬀects the estimates of all agents
who act at stage n, while the individual error captures idiosyncratic noise across agents within a
cohort. We follow Vives [19] in making the convention that the Strong Law of Large Numbers
applies exactly to the individual errors for a cohort, and also to any measurable subset of a cohort.
That is, we assume that for each cohort,11Z
A
εni di = 0 for any measurable subset A ⊆ [0, 1] . (1)
This implies that the mean of the individual signals in cohort n is
R 1
0 sni di = θ+ εn; as a matter of
shorthand, we will refer to sn = θ+ εn as the ‘cohort signal.’ Similarly, we refer to xn = R[0,1] xni di
as the average action in cohort n, or simply the cohort action. For the most part, the analysis will
only require keeping track of sn and xn, not the individual signals and actions. Let v = vc + vind
be the variance of sni . We require v > 0, but we allow the possibility of individual signals that are
uncorrelated (vc = 0) or perfectly correlated (vind = 0) across agents in a cohort. The structure of
9Of course, this convention makes gender time-inconsistent, but that is immaterial to the results.
10None of the results depend materially on diﬀuse priors, but by using them we will reduce the notational burden
substantially.
11Although property (1) is often used in the economics literature, integrating over a continuum of i.i.d random
variables presents certain technical complications, as discussed by Judd (1985) and Feldman and Gilles (1985). Green
(1994) shows that (1) can be justified if, instead of the usual Borel sets, one endows the population of the cohort with
an uncountably generated sigma-algebra. For the sake of expositional simplicity, we will just assume that (1) holds.
Note that idiosyncratic shocks will not play any role in the main results. If they are absent (that is, if vind = 0), then
(1) can be dropped, and the main results do not change.
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the game, and the primitives vc and vind are common knowledge; furthermore, each agent knows
which cohort she belongs to. The observational signal oni of agent ni depends on an observation
pool Pn−1 which contains a measure Pn−1 of the agents who arrived in stages 1 through n − 1.
Throughout most of the paper, we make the following assumption about this observational signal.
Population Average (PA) Agent ni observes the mean action x¯n−1 taken by all of the agents in
Pn−1.
This could represent a situation in which agents have access to a public summary statistic about
past actions. In Section 4, we will consider the following alternative assumption.
Sample Average (SA) Agent ni observes the mean action of S individual agents drawn randomly
from Pn−1, for an integer S ≥ 1. (Agent ni does not observe which cohorts these agents were
drawn from.)
After the agents in cohort n choose their actions xni , the observation pool is updated. The new
observation pool Pn is constructed from Pn−1 by the following steps. First, a measure dn−1 ≤ 1 of
(randomly chosen) agents in Pn−1 exit from the observation pool. Then all of the cohort n agents are
added to get Pn, and the game proceeds to stage n+1. Thus the size of the observation pool grows
according to Pn = Pn−1+1−dn−1. It is assumed throughout that the sequence {dn} converges, and
we also impose the following condition on the departure of old actions from the observation pool.12
Uniform Exit Every agent in Pn−1 has the same chance (1−dn−1/Pn−1) to survive and be present
in Pn.
Remark 1 Under these assumptions, the average action in the observation pool at stage n will be
a weighted average of the first n− 1 cohort actions x1 through xn−1, with (weakly) lower weight on
older cohorts.
The first part of the remark follows because for any cohort m < n, the average action among
cohortm agents remaining in Pn−1 is the same as the average action among those who have departed
— both are equal to xm, by (1). Older cohorts have smaller weights because their ranks have been
culled more times. Uniform exit implies that the observational signal preserves the relative weights
on the actions of diﬀerent past cohorts. That is, for any two past cohortsm andm0, the contributions
of both xm and xm0 to the average action in Pn−1 decline with n, but the ratio those contributions
does not change over time. The appeal of the uniform exit condition is mainly technical; it opens
the door to a recursive treatment of the observational signal without which the analysis would be
much less tractable.13
12Requiring {dn} to converge is mainly for technical and expositional convenience. This rules out persistent, abrupt
changes in the death rate, including cycles such as (d1, d2,d3, ...) = (0, 1, 0, 1, ...). Extending the analysis to handle
such cases would be fairly routine but tedious.
13This assumption plays a similar role to the ‘recursive sampling’ assumption used by Smith and Sørensen [17].
Among other implications, this assumption will impose a degree of smoothness on how the representation of cohorts
in Pn−1 changes with their vintage. For example, the assumption rules out finite moving averages in which agent n’s
observation puts positive weight on all cohorts more recent than n− k and zero weight on earlier cohorts.
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We define several closely related measures of learning: τni =
³
E((xni − θ)2)
´−1
is the precision
of agent ni’s estimate of θ, while κn = E((x¯n − θ)2) is the squared error in the population average
action after cohort n. The events at stage n = 1 diﬀer slightly from the general case. These
agents have no one to observe, so they must act on the basis of their individual signals s1i alone.
Furthermore, since there is no prior sample for the death rate to act upon, we have P1 = 1, where
P1 includes the full complement of cohort 1 actions and nothing else.
The size, composition, and evolution of the observation population depends entirely on our
assumptions about the exit rate dn. For example, if dn = 1 for all n, we say that there is immediate
exit. In this case, Pn = 1, Pn always consists of the most recent cohort, and each agent observes
the mean action of the most recent cohort. Alternatively, if dn = 0 for all n, then Pn = n and the
observation pool puts equal weight on all past actions. In this case, agent n+1 observes an equally
weighted blend of older and more recent actions. More generally, the larger dn is, the smaller the
contribution of older actions will be in the average that an agent observes. To make this a bit
more precise, we define a few terms. Let d˜ = limn→∞ dnPn be the limiting percentage exit rate; the
existence of this limit is straightforward to establish.14 Let #nm be the measure of cohort m actions
that remain in Pn−1, the pool observed at stage n, and let λnm = #nm/Pn−1 be their fraction in that
pool.
Def. We say that cohort m actions exit asymptotically exponentially if limn→∞ ln#
n
m
n−m < 0. Sim-
ilarly, we say their share of the observation pool declines asymptotically exponentially if
limn→∞ lnλ
n
m
n−m < 0. We say that exit (or decline of λnm) is asymptotically slower than expo-
nential if the respective limit is zero.
Def. The observation pool is bounded if Pn → N∗, for some N∗ <∞, and unbounded if Pn →∞.
Except for one special case (dn = 1 for all n), the existence of these limits follows directly from
the existence of d˜. Notice that asymptotically exponential exit implies that the measure of cohort
m agents remaining shrinks roughly as e−r(n−m), for some r > 0. We will say the observation
pool has property EE1 (SE1) if cohort m actions exit asymptotically exponentially (slower than
exponentially) for all m ≥ 1. Define properties EE2 and SE2 analogously for the share of cohort m
actions in the observation pool. Proposition 1 shows that these various measures of the persistence
of old actions are essentially equivalent.
Proposition 1 (Equivalent characterizations of exit) Suppose exit is not immediate. (There is at
least one cohort n0 with dn0 < 1.) Then,
1. d˜ > 0⇔ Pn is bounded ⇔ EE1 ⇔ EE2
2. d˜ = 0⇔ Pn is unbounded ⇔ SE1 ⇔ SE2
Excluding immediate exit is mainly for brevity of presentation — one may think of old actions as
exiting faster than exponentially in this case, since the limits defining EE1 and EE2 diverge. Given
14{Pn}n≥1, as a monotonically increasing sequence, must either converge or tend to infinity. In either case,
limn→∞ dnPn exists.
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Proposition 1, in the sequel we will often refer simply to exponential or slower than exponential
exit of old actions, without specifying #nm or λnm, and with the qualifier “asymptotically” always
implied.
3 Equilibrium
The first cohort is a special case: without predecessors to observe, and given her diﬀuse priors, the
optimal action for agent 1i is simply her signal: x1i = s1i . For cohorts n ≥ 2, we begin by reviewing
some standard results on normal learning. Suppose that agent ni observes x¯n−1 and sni and believes
that x¯n−1 ∼ N(θ,κn−1), sni ∼ N(θ, v), and that x¯n−1 and sni are independent conditional on θ.
Then she has a unique optimal action given by the precision-weighted average of her two signals:
xni = E(θ | x¯n−1, sni) = (1− αn)x¯n−1 + αnsni
αn =
(
1 if n = 1
κn−1κn−1+v if n > 1
, τni = κ−1n−1 + 1v (2)
These conditions apply for cohort 2 agents: they can infer how cohort 1 agents must have acted,
and this permits them to infer that x¯1 ∼ N(θ,κ1), with κ1 = vc. By acting optimally, they ensure
that x¯2 is a mixture of normally distributed, mean θ signals. Thus, x¯2 ∼ N(θ,κ2), where κ2 depends
on α2. But then, because cohort 3 agents can deduce how agents in the first two cohorts must have
acted, they can infer κ2, and so they too act according to (2). This logic applies inductively to all
future cohorts.
In order to provide a benchmark for the main results, we briefly discuss the learning path under
full information and under perfect observability of actions. Then we characterize learning in our
model with bounded and unbounded observation pools. Throughout, we will say that the sequence
κn converges to zero at rate g (n), for some increasing function g (n), if the sequence {g (n)κn}
converges to a finite, positive constant. Similarly, τni diverges at rate g (n) if
n τni
g(n)
o
converges to a
finite, positive constant. Note that these rates are measured with respect to the arrival rate of new
information with new cohorts, not calendar time, which plays no particular role in the model. Of
course, if we were to specify that new cohorts arrive at a certain rate per day or per year, it would
be a simple matter to express the convergence rate of κn or τni in terms of calendar time.
3.1 Benchmarks
We define two alternative versions of our game which will be used as benchmarks. In the full
information version of the game, agent ni’s observational signal oni contains the full sequence of
individual signals for all prior agents. In the perfect observability version, oni contains the full
sequence of actions by all prior agents. In the main model, κn is the variance of the deviation from
θ of the observational signal observed by cohort n+1. By analogy with this, let κFIn be the variance
of the best estimate of θ that can be made from the observational signal available to a cohort n+1
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agent in the full information game (and similarly for κPOn in the perfect observability version).
In the full information case, agent (n+ 1)i’s observational signal o(n+1)i is essentially equivalent
to (s1, ..., sn), since she can integrate out the individual-specific error terms. Furthermore, since
the prior cohorts’ signals are i.i.d. conditional on θ, a suﬃcient statistic for them is their mean
s¯n =
1
n
Pn
i=1 si, where s¯n ∼ N(θ, vc/n). The optimal action based on the observational signal alone
is s¯n, so κFIn = vcn . In other words, if all signals become public upon arrival, then the precision of
the observational signal improves at rate n. Of course, this is just the standard, textbook result
for aggregating normal random variables. Agent (n+ 1)i’s optimal action is a precision-weighted
average of s¯n with her individual signal sni . This is x
FI
(n+1)i
=
vcs(n+1)i+nvs¯n
vc+nv
which delivers precision
τFI(n+1)i = nvc + 1v .
Under perfect observability, it becomes quickly evident that even though agents do not observe
the sequence of signals directly, they can deduce the signals from the sequence of actions, and so
learning is as if we were in the full information case. Suppose that xPOmi = x
FI
mi for all m ≤ n.
That is, all agents in cohorts 1 through n act as as though they had access to the sequence of
past signals. Then the average action for each such cohort m must be a convex combination of
the signals ~sm = (s1, ..., sm), with strictly positive weight on sm.15 ,16 It follows that the vector
~xPOn = (x
PO
1 , ..., x
PO
n ) can be written ~x
PO
n = M~sn, where M is a lower triangular matrix with a
strictly positive main diagonal. M is invertible, so a cohort n+ 1 agent can recover ~sn =M−1~xPOn
by observing past cohort average actions ~xPOn . Consequently, if all earlier agents acted as if they
had access to full information about prior signals, then cohort n + 1 agents do as well. Because
cohort 1 trivially acts on full information, we can conclude inductively that all agents do, and so we
have xPOn = x
FI
n and κPOn = κFIn = nvc for all n. Once again, learning is at rate n.
3.2 The Speed of Learning in Case PA
Now we return to our baseline model PA: an agent observes the average action in a pool that
mixes recent actions and older ones. Define the partial sums of P−1n as Rn =
Pn
m=1
1
Pn
. From
Proposition 1, one can see that more persistent old actions tend to make Pn larger and Rn smaller;
this relationship will be sharpened in Section 3.3. Our main result on the speed of learning is the
following.17
Proposition 2 If If Pn is bounded, learning is at rate n. If Pn is not bounded, learning is at rate
Rn, which is slower than n. (That is, Rnn → 0.) In particular, if dn is bounded away from 1, learning
is at rate lnn.
15 In fact, it will be xPOm =
vs1+...+vsm−1+vcsm
vc+(m−1)v , which follows from x
FI
ni above.
16A simpler approach would be to note that if xPOn = s¯n, then agent n+ 1 can compute its full information action
from xPOn alone: x
PO
n+1 =
1
n+1
sn+1 +
n
n+1
xPOn = s¯n+1. This depends on the fact that with normal signals, s¯n is
suﬃcient for ~sn. However, we want to emphasize that suﬃciency is not critical here because the full vector of signals
can be recovered, hence the more circuitous approach.
17 If Pn is bounded, then Rn grows at rate n. Thus a more concise statement of the proposition is that learning
is at rate Rn, without qualification on Pn. We separate the bounded and unbounded cases only to emphasize when
learning will be slower than the full information rate.
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The proof is in the appendix. In the rest of this section, we develop the equations of motion
that govern the learning process and sketch some intuition for the result. To begin, suppose that
the agents in some cohort n can infer that the signal quality of the average action that they observe
is κn−1. Then how heavily will these agents weight their own signals, and how will their actions
feed into the κn observed by the next cohort? From (2), we have xni = (1− αn) x¯n−1+αnsni , with
αn = κn−1v+κn−1 . Thus, using (1), the average action within cohort n is xn = (1− αn) x¯n−1 + αnsn.
Meanwhile, a measure dn−1 of agents exit from the observation population. Because these agents are
selected randomly, the average action among these departers is identical to the average action among
those who remain — both are equal to x¯n−1. Then, the new observation population is composed of a
measure Pn−1−dn−1 of remaining agents and a measure 1 of cohort n agents. The updated average
action is
x¯n =
µ
1− αn
Pn
¶
x¯n−1 +
αn
Pn
sn . (3)
Because the errors in x¯n−1 and sn are independent, we have x¯n ∼ N(θ,κn), where:
κn =
µ
1− αn
Pn
¶2
κn−1 +
µαn
Pn
¶2
vc (4)
We can express this diﬀerence equation in κn as
κn − κn−1 = −2αn
Pn
κn−1 +
µαn
Pn
¶2
(vc + κn−1) (5)
= −Mn κ
2
n−1
v + κn−1
where Mn =
³
2− 1Pn vc+κn−1v+κn−1
´
1
Pn
.
To illustrate how the results of Proposition 2 come about, we introduce τ¯n = 1κn , the precision
of the observational signal after cohort n. (This is linked to τni , the precision of a cohort n agent’s
action xni , by τni = τ¯n−1 + v, since cohort n observes x¯n−1 and combines it optimally with sni .) If
we express (5) in terms of τ¯n, the equation of motion becomes particularly simple.
τ¯n − τ¯n−1 =Mn τ¯n−1
vτ¯n−1 + 1−Mn ≈
Mn
v
where the last approximation applies when κn−1 is suﬃciently small (so τ¯n−1 is suﬃciently large).
If the population size is bounded, thenMn tends toward
¡
2− 1N∗ vcv
¢
1
N∗ , and so τ¯n grows roughly as¡¡
2− 1N∗ vcv
¢
1
N∗
¢
n. Alternatively, if the population size is unbounded, then for large n we have the
approximation τ¯n − τ¯n−1 ≈ 2Pn , so τ¯n eventually grows (and κn shrinks) like 2Rn. However, in this
case, Rn always grows more slowly than n. The worst outcome (as the last point of the proposition
notes) is when the exit rate of old agents never catches up to the entry rate of new ones — that is,
when dn is bounded below 1. In this case, the size of the observation pool grows linearly in n, so
τ¯n is on the order of Pnm=1 1m ≈ lnn.
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A more economic intuition for the slowdown in learning can be gleaned from (5), where the
dominant term can be written (κn − κn−1) /κn−1 ≈ −2αn/Pn. That is, the incremental percentage
improvement in public information depends on how aggressively arriving agents incorporate new
information in their actions (αn) and on how much that new information is diluted by being mixed
into the population average action (P−1n ). Free-riding on the public signal tends to slow learning
because αn declines as κn becomes more precise. This is exacerbated when old actions exit slowly,
because Pn grows and so the dilution of new information worsens over time.
This is a useful time to remark on the tractability purchased by the uniform exit assumption.
Without this assumption, characterizing κn would require keeping track of the action and the
remaining size of each preceding cohort — that is, we would have to monitor a state variable that
increases in dimensionality over time. Under uniform exit, κn−1 is suﬃcient for κn, so the dynamics
are recursive and relatively simple.
3.3 The Persistence of Old Information in Case PA
To provide more insight about the causes of slow learning, we develop three measures of a cohort’s
influence: the share of its action in the observation pool, the weight of its signal in that pool, and
the fraction of the error in the observational signal that it is responsible for. One of the keys to slow
learning is that the second two types of influence can persist long after most of the actions in that
cohort have departed.
The fraction of cohort n’s observation x¯n−1 composed of cohortm actions was introduced earlier;
it is λnm. Notice that x¯n−1 is a weighted average of cohort actions {x1, x2, ..., xn−1}, so we can write
x¯n−1 =
Pn−1
m=1 λnmxm, with
Pn−1
m=1 λnm = 1. Next, notice that because each xn is a linear combination
of of the average idiosyncratic signal of cohort n and past actions, we can also write x¯n−1 as a
weighted average of the cohort signals {s1, s2, ..., sn−1}: x¯n−1 =
Pn−1
m=1 πnmsm, where the weights πnm
satisfy
Pn−1
m=1 πnm = 1. Finally, because the cohort signals are i.i.d. with variance vc, the expected
squared error in the observational signal x¯n−1 can be written κn−1 = vcPn−1m=1 (πnm)2. Each term
in this sum represents the contribution of cohort m information sm = θ + εm to the ‘public error’
observed by the agents acting at stage n. The fraction of that public error that can be attributed
to cohort m can therefore be written χnm ≡ vc(πnm)
2
κn−1 = (πnm)2 /
Pn−1
m=1 (πnm)2.
Proposition 1 has already begun to characterize how long old actions persist (in terms of the
primitive dn). While this has to do with how fast λnm tends to zero with n, it will be convenient to
focus instead on how fast ln (1/λnm) tends to infinity with n.18 We will say that old actions exit at log
rate g (n) if {ln (1/λnm)}n>m → ∞ at rate g (n). (So for example, if old actions exit exponentially,
then they exit at log rate n.) For the persistence of old information, we study the rates at which
πnm, and χnm tend to zero with n (if they do); call these the decay rates of cohort m information
and cohort m relative influence, respectively. If the observational signal were to aggregate private
18The reason is technical. It will turn out that λnm → 0 at rate exp (rRn + o (Rn)), for some constant r. The
non-leading o (Rn) terms are unwieldy and of no particular interest, since later results depend only on Rn. Focusing
on ln (λnm) streamlines the analysis, as these non-leading terms vanish relative to Rn.
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information eﬃciently, then each cohort’s signal would be equally weighted, and both πnm, and χnm
would tend to zero at rate n. To see how action and information persistence actually behave under
social learning, consider how πnm, and χnm evolve from stage n to n+1. In the first stage after cohort
m acts, we have λm+1m = 1/Pm and πm+1m = αm/Pm. Thereafter, the weights evolve recursively
according to:
λn+1m =
µ
1− 1
Pn
¶
λnm and πn+1m =
µ
1− αn
Pn
¶
πnm for n > m
Immediately after cohort m has acted, we have πm+1m < λm+1m : Pm contains every cohort m action,
but those actions put only weight αm < 1 on the new information sm.19 At each subsequent stage
though, the impact of m’s action shrinks by a percentage 1Pn , but the impact of its information
shrinks by the smaller percentage αnPn . This reflects the fact that signal sm becomes impounded in
the actions of later cohorts to the extent that those cohorts free-ride on their observational signal. As
public information improves, αn declines (agents free-ride more on the past), and so old information
vanishes more and more slowly.
Proposition 3 provides a precise characterization of the relationship between old actions and old
information. The proof requires a regularity condition (Poly) for cases in which the observation
pool diverges slowly.
(Poly) If Pn →∞ and Pn/Rn → 0, then there is some b ∈ (0, 1) such that Pn grows at rate nb.
The main substantive eﬀect of this condition is to exclude from analysis certain cases in which
the observation pool grows very slowly (sub-polynomially); in these excluded cases, old actions exit
very slightly slower than exponentially.20 The other eﬀect is to impose a type of smoothness on
slowly growing pools that is useful in proving parts of the next result.
Proposition 3 Suppose (Poly) holds and exit is not immediate. The action, information, and
relative influence of cohort m decay at the following rates.
1. (Actions) lnλnm → −∞ at rate Rn.
2. (Information)21 πnm → 0 at rate (Rn)η, where η =
¡
2− vcv limn→∞(1/Pn)
¢−1.
3. (Relative Influence)
(a) If Pn is bounded with Pn → N∗, then χnm → 0 at rate (Rn)
vc
2vN∗−vc .
(b) If Pn is unbounded, then χnm converges to a strictly positive constant as n→∞.
Immediate exit is excluded, as earlier, for the sake of parsimony. If exit is immediate, then
information is aggregated eﬃciently: πnm = χnm = 1n . The following corollary is just a simple
restatement of part (1).
19The first cohort is an exception; we have λ21 = π21 since α1 = 1.
20To be precise, exit in these cases satisfies limn→∞ lnλ
n
m
n
= 0 and limn→∞ lnλ
n
m
n1−b = −∞ for any b > 0.
21Note that 1/Pn converges regardless of whether Pn is bounded or diverges, so the limit embedded in the definition
of η is well defined.
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Corollary 1 Fix any arbitrary cohort m. If cohort m exits from the observation pool at log rate
g (n), then learning is at rate g (n).
The main results here deserve emphasis. First, learning is tied to the rate at which old actions
exit from the observation pool. If old actions exit at least exponentially (that is, at log rate n), then
learning is at the full-information rate. If old actions disappear more slowly than this, then learning
will be slower than rate n.
Second, the information of a cohort decays more slowly than its action (polynomially rather
than exponentially in Rn). To put this in high relief, notice that we can approximate: ln (1/πnm) ≈
η ln (ln (1/λnm)), where higher values of ln (1/πnm) and ln (1/λnm) reflect faster departure of cohort m
information and actions respectively. This approximation also suggests two channels through which
cohort m information becomes particularly persistent if Pn is unbounded (rather than bounded).
First, cohort m’s action sticks around longer (that is, ln (1/λnm) is smaller) if Pn is unbounded,
and this has a direct eﬀect on the persistence of its information. The second eﬀect is indirect: the
persistence of cohort m’s information is greater relative to the persistence of its action when Pn is
unbounded, because η is smaller. (If Pn is bounded (unbounded), η > (=) 12 .) This reflects a knock-
on eﬀect: the longer that an old action persists, the more time it has to influence later cohorts, and
that influence persists after the original action is gone.
Third, if old actions exit slower than exponentially, then their relative influence never disappears!
An example makes the point rather forcefully. Suppose the observation pool includes all past actions,
so dn = 0 and Pn = n.22 Then simulations show that χn1 tends to approximately 0.82. That is, as
far into the future as one likes, 82% of the squared error in the public signal x¯n comes from the
signal error of the very first cohort.
Fourth, given the equivalences laid out in Proposition 1, one might wonder whether there are
other simple barometers of whether learning will be fast or slow. A natural candidate has to do
with what we will call the cumulative persistence of old actions. Define cohort m’s cumulative
persistence to be
P∞
n=m+1 λnm; this captures the cumulative direct impact of cohort m actions, or
equivalently (with an additional normalization) the average duration of a cohort m action in the
observation pool. An immediate conjecture is that the boundary between fast and slow learning
could be related to whether cumulative persistence is finite or infinite. Proposition 3 makes it easy
to test this conjecture. To illustrate, consider three diﬀerent scenarios in which old actions exit fast
(λnm ∝ e−n), slightly slower (λnm ∝ e−
√
n), or quite slowly (λnm ∝ 1/n). In the first two scenarios,
the cumulative persistence of every cohort is finite, while in the third, each cohort’s cumulative
persistence is infinite. However, social learning is at rate n only in the first scenario, and slower in
the second two, so the conjecture cannot hold.23
Finally, a few technical points should be clarified; a reader who wishes to avoid these details
could skip ahead. The fact that none of the decay rates for cohort m depends on m is a consequence
22For this example, we set v = vc = 1.
23Section 6.1 provides further insight about why the exit rate of old actions, rather than their cumulative persistence,
is the most useful barometer for assessing the speed of learning.
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of the uniform exit assumption. The main substantive implication of condition (Poly) is to exclude
cases in which Pn diverges at a very slow, sub-polynomial rate; for example, Pn = lnn. In such
cases, Proposition 2 still applies — old actions exit slower than exponentially, and learning is slower
than rate n — but the other quantities in Proposition 3 are diﬃcult to characterize cleanly.24 Finally,
we note that the motivation for the rather long proof of part (2) is to get to the clean, and somewhat
startling result in (3b). Settling for the convergence rate of lnπnm (similarly to part (1)) would be
much simpler but would not provide enough precision to show that (3b) is true.
3.4 The Importance of Free-riding
At this point, we have seen slow learning can arise when old information is persistent and self-
interested agents put less weight on their own signals than later generations would like them to. We
have also seen (in the bounded Pn case), that the free-riding problem is not suﬃcient to slow down
learning by itself, if old actions are weeded out relatively quickly. However, we have not yet seen
whether free-riding is necessary to get slow learning. To answer this, consider a contrived situation
in which a social planner has the power to choose the weights αn ∈ [0, 1] that cohorts place on their
own signals. This planner knows the path of Pn but has no other information or instruments at her
disposal; in particular, she cannot control dn and Pn and she cannot help the agents to communicate
about their signals. She chooses a sequence {an}n≥1 with the sole objective of reducing the error in
the public signal as quickly as possible.25
Proposition 4 The social planner can attain rate n learning, regardless of the rate at which old
actions exit.
Proof. Set αn = Pnn . This is feasible (since Pn ≤ n). A brief inspection of (4) shows that this
policy attains κn = vcn and τ¯n = n/vc for all n ≥ 1.
Proposition 4 makes it clear that both elements — old information that is suﬃciently persistent,
and agents who ignore the informational spillover generated by their actions — are required to get
slow social learning.
4 Observing the Average of a Finite Sample (SA)
In this section we develop the sample average (SA) version of the model. The most surprising
results revolve around the fact that there are essentially no benefits from observing larger samples
— learning is no faster, and agents’ utility is no higher. This runs counter to the usual intuition that
larger samples help to average out idiosyncratic mistakes. The usual intuition is not wrong per se,
24The main reason for interest in these intermediate, sub-polynomial Pn cases would be to test the conjecture that
learning is slower than rate n if and only if the relative influence of older cohorts does not decay. This would be true
if (3b) could be extended to all unbounded Pn. However, one can find examples (Pn = lnn is one) for which this
conjecture is false: learning is slower than rate n, but χnm tends to 0 with n. Further details are available on request.
25Since the result below has to do with feasibility rather than optimality, this objective function appears only for
motivational purposes. If we were interested in deriving optimal {αn}n≥1 policies, this objective would need to be
stated with substantially more precision.
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but social learning leads people to make highly correlated mistakes, and it is this common portion
of their errors that comes to dominate the speed of learning. This helps to explain the fact that we
see identical rates of learning in models SA and PA, even though the ‘sample’ in the latter case is
the entire observation pool.
Let the observation pool evolve just as before, and let xPn−1 refer to an arbitrary individual
action belonging to Pn−1. A typical member ni of cohort n receives her idiosyncratic signal sni as
before, plus an observational signal xS(ni). This observational signal is the mean of S ≥ 1 individual
actions xPn−1 drawn randomly from Pn−1. This is all that agent ni knows about her observational
signal; she does not observe the individual actions that comprise xS(ni), nor does she observe the
ages of those individual actions.26 Of course, she will be able to draw certain inferences about the
likely composition of xS(ni) based on her knowledge about how Pn−1 evolves.
Because the members of a cohort will now receive diﬀerent observational signals, some new nota-
tion will be required. Let κˆn−1 = E
³¡
xPn−1 − θ
¢2´ be a cohort n agent’s expectation of the squared
error in an individual action drawn randomly from Pn−1, and let ρˆn−1 = E
³¡
xPn−1 − θ
¢ ³
x0Pn−1 − θ
´´
be her expectation of the covariance in the errors of two randomly drawn actions. Together, κˆn−1
and ρˆn−1 determine the precision of a cohort n agent’s observational signal, and consequently, her
action and expected utility.
Lemma 1 The expected squared error of a cohort n observational signal is
κ¯n−1 ≡ E
³¡
xS(ni) − θ
¢2´
=
1
S
κˆn−1 + S − 1
S
ρˆn−1 .
The optimal action of a cohort n agent ni with observational signal xS(ni) and idiosyncratic signal
sni is xni = αˆnsni + (1− αˆn)xS(ni), where αˆn = κ¯n−1κ¯n−1+v . This agent’s expected utility is −αˆnv.
We will work with κˆn as our measure of learning, but we shall see that κ¯n and αˆn behave
similarly. Notice that −κˆn is also the expected utility of an agent drawn randomly from Pn, so
we will sometimes refer to it as the mean utility in the observation pool. The expression for κ¯n−1
makes it clear that an increase in her sample size S only benefits an agent to the extent that the
error covariance ρˆn−1 among the sampled actions is low.
Also notice that in order to characterize the quantities of interest in the model, it is not necessary
to describe the sampling history — the list specifying the identities of the agents whose actions appear
in each sample. This sampling history is not a part of agents’ information sets, and neither their
expectations κˆn−1 and ρˆn−1, nor their choice variables αˆn can condition on it. In contrast with
the common observational signal of model PA, now some agents will be luckier with their sampling
than others. The luckiest will sample recent actors who themselves sampled recent actors, and so
on, while the unluckiest will sample very old actions. But because an agent does not know that she
has been lucky or unlucky, this has no eﬀect on behavior. Luck in sampling does have distributional
26The case of K = 1 is an exception: if agent ni’s sample includes a single action, then of course xS(ni) trivially
reveals that action.
17
implications: some people within a cohort will be (unwittingly) better informed than average, and
thus better oﬀ than the average utility of −αˆnv, while others will be worse informed and worse oﬀ.27
While it would be interesting to pursue these implications, we will not do so here.28
The evolution of κˆn diﬀers from that of κn in model PA (see (4)) because now we are dealing
with the mean squared error of individual actions in Pn rather than the squared error of the mean
action in that pool. As the observation pool adjusts from Pn−1 to Pn, a measure dn of agents depart
and the full measure 1 of cohort n agents are added. Because the departing agents are determined
randomly, the expected squared error among the remaining Pn−1−dn agents remains equal to κˆn−1.
The expected squared error for entering agents is αˆnv, so κˆn is simply:
κˆn =
µ
1− 1
Pn
¶
κˆn−1 + 1
Pn
(αˆnv) , n > 1 (6)
The error covariance among sampled actions aﬀects κˆn through the error αˆnv of the new arrivals:
αˆn depends on squared error in their observational signal κ¯n−1, which in turn depends on ρˆn−1. In
order to develop a recursive characterization of that covariance, let us call a sampled action xPn
‘new’ if it occurred at the most recent stage n, or ‘old’ if it occurred earlier. Let ρˆn|new,new be the
conditional error covariance of two sampled actions that happen to be new:
ρˆn|new,new = E
¡
(xPn − θ)
¡
x0Pn − θ
¢ |xPn and x0Pn are new¢
and define ρˆn|new,old and ρˆn|old,old analogously. An action drawn from Pn is new with probability
1/Pn, so the unconditional error covariance of two action drawn from Pn may be written
ρˆn =
µ
1− 1
Pn
¶2
ρˆn|old,old + 2Pn
µ
1− 1
Pn
¶
ρˆn|new,old + 1P 2n ρˆn|new,new
Next we address these conditional covariance terms, one by one. The first one, ρˆn|old,old, is simply
ρˆn−1, the error covariance from one stage ago. For the second term, suppose that xPn is the new
action drawn from stage n (while x0Pn occurred prior to stage n). Then xPn is a weighted average of
a new idiosyncratic signal (with weight αˆn) that is uncorrelated with earlier errors, and S actions
randomly drawn from Pn−1. Call these old actions yold1 , ..., yoldS . Then the covariance of xPn and
x0Pn is
E
¡
(xPn − θ)
¡
x0Pn − θ
¢ |xPn is new, x0Pn is old¢ = 1S (1− αˆn)
SX
s=1
E
¡¡
x0Pn − θ
¢
(yolds − θ)
¢
.
27Of course, both here and in model PA, there are also diﬀerences in outcomes due simply to idiosyncratic signals.
28 In particular, one might like to know about divergence: do the luckiest (unluckiest) agents learn at a faster (slower)
rate than average? On this question, the answer appears to be a qualified no. The luckiest samplers consistently rely
on their private signals too much (since they do not realize how accurate their observations are). A casual analysis
(details on request) indicates that this limits their precision to around double that of an average agent. The very
worst oﬀ agents make no progress over time (since sampling only from cohort 1 is always a possibility). However, no
positive fraction of a cohort can have errors too much worse than average, lest they drag up the average.
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But each expectation in the summation is just ρˆn|old,old, so we have ρˆn|new,old = (1− αˆn) ρˆn|old,old,
or ρˆn|new,old = (1− αˆn) ρˆn−1. Finally, for the case of two new actions, note that xPn and x0Pn will
both put weight αˆn on the cohort n error εn, while their observational signals have error covariance
ρˆn|old,old, so we arrive at ρˆn|new,new = (1− αˆn)2 ρˆn−1 + αˆ2nvc. Combining these pieces, we have
ρˆn =
µ
1− αˆn
Pn
¶2
ρˆn−1 +
µ αˆn
Pn
¶2
vc , n > 1 (7)
For completeness, note also that κˆ1 = v and ρˆ1 = vc.29 Just as κˆn depends on ρˆn−1 through the
weight αˆn−1, so does ρˆn depend on κˆn−1 through αˆn. Equations (6) and (7), along with αˆn, fully
characterize agents’ behavior, and determine the rate of social learning with finite samples. The
special case in which agents sample single actions (S = 1) is a bit simpler, as the evolution of κˆn is
characterized by (6) alone.
As a first step, we ask how correlated the errors in sampled actions are. This correlation coeﬃ-
cient is
ρˆn
κˆn = E
¡
(xPn − θ)
¡
x0Pn − θ
¢¢,r
E
³
(xPn − θ)2
´
E
³¡
x0Pn − θ
¢2´ .
The benefit of observing a larger sample is greatest when ρˆnκˆn is relatively small. Unfortunately for
agents, the errors in their predecessors’ actions become highly correlated very quickly.
Proposition 5 If S > 1, then the error correlation of two actions drawn from Pn−1 tends to one:
ρˆnκˆn → 1.
We postpone discussing this result until after presenting rates of learning. The proof leverages
the fact that the size of decreases κˆn − κˆn−1 in average squared error can be shown to be roughly
proportional to κˆn−1− ρˆn−1. Meanwhile, decreases ρˆn− ρˆn−1 in the covariance are roughly propor-
tional to ρˆ2n−1. The decline that is first order in the variables happens fast, bringing κˆn close to ρˆn
before the the latter gets close to zero.
As a consequence of Proposition 5, the speed of social learning is governed by the rate at which
the covariance of action errors is driven to zero. Consulting (7), we see an expression that is almost
identical to (4), but with κn replaced by ρˆn and αn replaced by αˆn. When we observe that αˆn tends
toward
ρˆn−1ρˆn−1+v (because of Proposition 5), the resemblance becomes exact, giving us the following
result.
Proposition 6 (Rates of social learning in the sample average model)
i) If S = 1, then κˆnRn → v.
ii) If S > 1, then κˆnRn, ρˆnRn, and vαˆnRn all tend to vη, where η =
³
2− vcv limn→∞ 1Pn
´−1
.
Thus, social learning is always at rate Rn.
29So in fact, if we were willing to ignore the fact that κˆ0 and ρˆ0 are not defined, equations (6) and (7) actually apply
at n = 1 as well.
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Let us briefly summarize the results for the case (Pn = n) in which old actions never exit from
the pool that later agents sample. If agents sample one predecessor each, without knowing when he
acted or whom he observed, learning is at rate lnn. If instead, each agent sees the average of two
samplees, the rate at which (expected squared) errors disappear remains lnn, but the level of those
errors is cut in half. If the size of the sample increases further, neither the rate of learning nor the
level of errors improves. Furthermore, returning to our baseline model with each agent observing
the average action in the entire population yields no further changes in the rate of learning, or the
level of errors.
Why does the size of an agent’s sample make so little diﬀerence? It may be helpful (albeit
slightly imprecise) to think of splitting an agent’s expected error κˆn into mistakes κˆn − ρˆn that are
idiosyncratic to her, and mistakes ρˆn that are common to other agents. A larger sample does help
to drive the idiosyncratic portion κˆn − ρˆn down to zero quickly.30 However, the errors that remain
are highly correlated across individuals, so larger samples do little to eradicate them.31
5 Extensions
In this section we add several new features to the baseline population average learning model,
including heterogeneous preferences, a self-reliance bias, and drift in the optimal action θ.32 The
first two features will imply, counter to our earlier results, that having older actions linger in the
observation pool can be beneficial for the speed of learning. In both cases, the reason is that an
agent no longer wishes to rely solely on her most recent predecessors for guidance because (from her
point of view) they have over-relied on their idiosyncratic information. In contrast, if θ is a moving
target, the disadvantages of relying on older information become more severe.
5.1 Heterogeneity
We return to the framework of the PA model, but now we assume that diﬀerent individuals have
diﬀerent optimal decisions. We model this by assuming that agent ni chooses xni to minimize
E((xni − θni)2 | Ini), where θni = θ + μni . The new term μni represents a shifter that is specific to
the individual agent. These taste shocks are distributed i.i.d. (across cohorts and individuals) with
μni ∼ N(θ, vta), and their variance vta is common knowledge among agents.
As before, an agent’s information set Ini always contains an observational signal equal to the
average action in Pn−1. We consider two diﬀerent specifications for the agent’s idiosyncratic in-
formation. In the known private taste version of the model, agent ni observes the pair of signals©
sni ,μni
ª
, where sni = θ + εn + εni as earlier. In other words, she sees a signal about the action
30We do not demonstrate this formally, but expressions for the rate of change of κˆn − ρˆn suggest that it declines
faster if S−1
S
is large.
31 It seems plausible that larger samples might have benefits if there were additional sources of idiosyncratic error in
the model. For example, heterogeneous tastes (as developed for model PA in Section 5.1) generate a persistent source
of idiosyncratic variation in actions that an observer could minimize with a large sample.
32These extensions could be applied to model SA as well, but analysis would be a bit more tedious because of the
extra state variable.
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θ that is best for a typical agent, and she also knows which direction (and how much) to adjust
that action to better suit herself. In the shrouded private taste version of the model, agent ni ob-
serves the idiosyncratic signal s˜ni = θni + εn + εni . The terms εn and εni represent cohort and
individual-specific errors as before, with the added proviso that these errors are independent of the
taste shocks.33 Thus, the agent has a noisy signal about her personal optimal action θni , but she
does not observe μni directly, so she does not know how diﬀerent she is from a ‘typical’ agent. We
include both specifications because both are plausible, and they have quite diﬀerent implications for
learning. In our years of schooling example, the taste shifter could reflect relative ability — perhaps
the optimal amount of schooling is higher for smarter students. In this case, it may be reasonable
to think that a student knows her taste shock μni — say by comparing herself to her classmates
— but still needs to learn about the average costs and returns to schooling (as summarized by θ)
before making a decision. In this case, the known taste model applies. Alternatively, suppose in our
irrigation example that a farmer has information about the past returns to irrigating his own land
— call this s˜ni — but does not know whether his land is predisposed (for geological reasons, perhaps)
to need more or less water than the average plot. While his idiosyncratic information may suggest
that he should use more or less water than other farmers have done (i.e., if s˜ni − x¯n−1 is positive or
negative), he cannot be certain how much of that diﬀerence s˜ni − x¯n−1 represents private value and
how much is just noise. In this case, the shrouded taste model would be appropriate.34
5.1.1 Known Private Tastes
If agents can observe their relative private value shifters directly, the analysis remains very close to
the original PA model. It is straightforward to see that the optimal action for agent ni is to form
her best estimate of θ given signals sni and x¯n−1, and then add μni to get her optimal action. Thus,
xni = αnsni + (1− αn) x¯n−1 + μni , where αn =
κn−1
κn−1 + v
As in the shrouded private values case, the mean action of cohort n is xn = αnsn+(1− αn) x¯n−1 =
αn (θ + εn) + (1− αn) x¯n−1. The evolution of x¯n and κn follow the same equations as in model PA.
Because αn is also chosen just as in model PA, the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 2 In the model with known private values, social learning about θ takes place at the same
rate that applies in the baseline model PA.
5.1.2 Shrouded Private Tastes
Other than the stated changes, the model is identical to our baseline model PA. Notice that there is
no prospect for complete learning about individual targets, in the sense of E
³
(xni − θni)2
´
tending
to zero over time, because an agent’s only information about her taste shock comes from her private
33Also, we extend assumption (1) to the taste shocks.
34One can easily imagine intermediate cases that we will not pursue here. For example, rather than observe μni
separately and perfectly, an agent could observe it separately but with noise.
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signal. Instead, we focus on how quickly the true value of θ, the common part of the optimal
action, is revealed. As earlier, let x¯n be the average action in the observation pool Pn−1. We retain
κn = E((x¯n − θ)2) as our measure of learning.
We begin by observing that the average action x¯n−1 is a less precise signal about agent ni’s
personal optimal action when tastes are very heterogeneous; the larger vta, the more weight she will
want to shift onto her private signal in forming her action. To derive her optimal action, consider
the errors in her two signals: x¯n−1 − θni = (x¯n−1 − θ)− μni and s˜ni − θni = εn + εni . These errors
are independent of each other, and moreover, the two components of the observational signal error
— the deviation of x¯n−1 from θ, and the deviation of θ from θni — are also independent. Thus the
errors in x¯n−1 and s˜ni have variances of κn−1+ vta and v respectively. As before, agent ni’s optimal
action is a precision-weighted average of these two signals:35
xni = αns˜ni + (1− αn) x¯n−1, where αn = κn−1 + vtaκn−1 + vta + v
Notice that the own signal weight is bounded away from zero, αn > vta/ (vta + v), regardless of how
accurately observational information reveals θ. Of course, this simply reflects the wedge created by
the taste shock.
Let s˜n be the mean of the cohort n private signals. The taste shocks wash out of this mean
by assumption (1), so we have s˜n = θ + εn, and the mean action over cohort n is still given by
xn = αns˜n + (1− αn) x¯n−1. The recursive expression (3) still characterizes the updated average
action x¯n, and so the evolution of κn is still governed by
κn =
µ
1− αn
Pn
¶2
κn−1 +
µαn
Pn
¶2
vc (8)
Thus any diﬀerences in the speed of learning with shrouded private tastes (relative to model PA) can
be attributed the fact that agents’ “self-reliance” is bounded away from zero. Define α¯ = vtavta+v , the
limiting weight placed on one’s own signal under the assumption that κn → 0, and d¯ = limn→∞ dn.
It is useful to define a quantity β = 2α¯
1−d¯ which is small when old actions are very persistent and
tastes are similar, and large when tastes are quite diﬀerent and old actions exit quickly.
Proposition 7 Rates of social learning in the model with shrouded private tastes are as summarized
in Table 1.
The awkward statement of the final case — roughly, learning is neither faster nor slower than rate
nβ — could be tightened at the cost of additional technical assumptions.36 To summarize informally,
greater persistence of old actions in the observation pool has a non-monotonic eﬀect on the rate of
learning. Learning is fastest (rate n) if the mass of departing old actions is smaller than the mass
35As earlier, we write αn rather than αni because the optimal weight is the same for all cohort n agents.
36An examination of the proof suggests that suﬃciently quick convergence of dn to d¯ (rate na for any a > 0 should
do) suﬃces for the convergence of nβκn.
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Growth of Pn Learning
(1) Bounded Incomplete: κn converges to a strictly positive constant
(2) Unbounded, with Pnn → 0 κn → 0 at rate Pn
(3) Unbounded, with Pnn → 1− d¯ ∈ (0, 2α¯) κn → 0 at rate n ( = rate Pn)
(4) Unbounded, with Pnn → 1− d¯ > 2α¯ κn → 0 faster than rate n
β−² and slower than nβ+²
(for any ² > 0)
Table 1: Rates of learning in the shrouded private taste model. Reading from top to bottom, each
case represents progressively slower exit of old actions. Case (4) may be read as: nβ−²κn → 0 and
nβ+²κn →∞, for any ² > 0.
of new actions (d¯ < 1), but not too much smaller (d¯ > 1 − 2α¯). If old actions are more or less
persistent than this, then learning slows down.
The reason for the change in results (relative to Proposition 2) is that private values induce
agents to put more weight on their own information. As we saw in Proposition 4, increasing αn can
counteract the tendency of old actions to retard learning, but if αn rises too much, a new problem
arises — the observation pool can tilt too far toward the most recent information. If β is small, then
excessive weight on old information remains the bottleneck in learning, while if β = ∞ (because
dn → 1), excess weight on recent information becomes the bottleneck. When the persistence of old
actions is just balanced by the ‘self reliance’ induced by heterogeneity, learning is fast.
Thus the speed of learning with heterogeneity depends critically on whether agents are able
to separate information that pertains to them specifically (μni) from information about θ that is
relevant to all agents. If this separation is possible, then they will respond to the individual-specific
information while continuing to underweight (from a social point of view) their information about
θ. If they cannot separate individual-specific from general information about the decision, then in
their desire to respond to the former, their actions will as a side-eﬀect bring more new information
about θ along for the ride. Because there is underlying bias toward old information (for the reasons
discussed in earlier sections), either private value scenario could lead to faster learning than the
other, depending on how severe that underlying bias toward old information is.37
5.2 Self Reliance Bias
Informally, one could interpret the weight αn that an agent places on her idiosyncratic signal as “self
reliance.” In the standard version of the model, self-reliance tends to zero as the public signal grows
more precise, whereas in the shrouded private taste model, self-reliance is (rationally) bounded
away from zero no matter how precise public information becomes. Experimental studies of herding
and social learning often find that subjects are more self reliant than theory would predict; .we
will refer to this as “self reliance bias.” The clearest evidence for this bias comes from models of
37Munshi [15] tests for a very similar issue in agricultural data from India, and finds results that are roughly
consistent with ours. He finds weaker social learning about a crop (rice) with yields that are sensitive to farmer
characteristics (like the soil type in a field) that are hard for other farmers to observe. Conversely, social learning is
stronger for wheat, where individual heterogeneity is less important. In his setting, learning is largely from recent
planting decisions (as well as yield outcomes), so the confounding eﬀect of old actions seems likely to be small.
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herding with binary actions and signals; in a meta-study pooling data from 13 diﬀerent experiments,
Weizsäcker [20] finds that when subjects’ private and observational signals conflict, they act on their
private signals unless the posterior odds are at least 2:1 against being correct.38 In the setting of
our model, one can imagine a number of plausible reasons that people might exhibit a self reliance
bias, including the following: (1) Subjects might overestimate the precision of their own private
information. (2) Subjects might have doubts about the competence of their predecessors. (3) A
subject might suspect that her predecessors’ actions reflect a diﬀerent objective than her own. (4)
Properly evaluating observational data requires a chain of relatively sophisticated inferences, while
evaluating one’s private information is straightforward. Subjects may have more confidence in their
own ability to handle the latter task without making mistakes.
To illustrate the implications of a self reliance bias as transparently as possible, we introduce
the following assumption in our baseline PA model.39
SRB For all n > 1, every agent places the same weight α > 0 on her own signal.
While the main attraction of SRB is simplicity, it could be motivated as something akin to a
stationarity requirement on strategies. In some situations it may be realistic to assume that an
agent does not have a clear sense of how long learning has been going on prior to her arrival; in this
case, her strategy should not condition on her cohort number. Under assumption SRB, the squared
error in the population average action κn still evolves according to (4), but individual actions do
not converge to θ. Agent ni’s action never gets closer to θ than an expected squared error of
α2v, regardless of n, due to the persistent introduction of new idiosyncratic error. When we frame
learning in terms of κn below, the interpretation should be that this reflects how accurately an agent
could predict θ after stage n if she were willing to rely on x¯n exclusively. Define β = 2α1−d¯ similarly
to the previous section.
Proposition 8 Under assumption SRB, the rate of learning is essentially the same as in the
shrouded private taste model. That is, if Pn is bounded, κn tends to a constant. If Pn is unbounded,
then κn → 0 at the rate specified for β in Proposition 7.
The proof is omitted. It follows exactly the same lines as the proof of Proposition 7 but is
simpler because in this case, αn reaches its limiting value immediately. The logic is essentially the
same as well — because a self reliance bias tilts the observation pool toward recent information, it
can partially correct (or overcorrect) the underlying bias toward old information. Thus, this bias
can be socially useful, even though from an individual’s point of view it represents a mistake.
38Because the likelihood ratio for a single private signal was also 2:1 (that is,
Pr (correct signal) /Pr (incorrect signal) = 2) in most of these studies, one interpretation is that subjects acted
as though they had a second independent private signal confirming the first one. One of the constituent studies,
Goeree et al. [13], also finds that subjects roughly double-count their own signals in the context of a structural
quantal response model of behavior.
39A natural alternative would be to assume that an agent overestimates the precision of her private signal. If each
agent acts as though her signal has precision kv−1 instead of v−1, with k > 1, then self-reliance will be roughly k
times as large as it should be, for large n, but it will still tend to zero over time. It is straightforward to see that
this will not change the analysis in Section 3 appreciably. The level of error in the public signal will be lower than if
agents behaved rationally, but the rate of learning will be the same.
24
5.3 Moving Target
In this section, we start from the baseline PA model, but now we assume that the optimal action
drifts over time. Instead of a static target θ, suppose that a cohort n agent ni tries to minimize
E((xni − θn)2 | Ini), where θn follows a random walk: θn = θn−1 + υn, where the increments are
i.i.d υn ˜N (0, vmt). (Let θn take initial value θ1.) If the environment changes quickly relative to
the rate at which agents act, this model may be more apt than our standard model. As one might
expect, a moving target makes the persistence of older actions in the observation pool even more
disadvantageous for learning than in our baseline model.
Agent ni’s idiosyncratic signal is now sni = θn+ εn+ εni (with εn and εni distributed as earlier)
— thus cohort n’s signals embed information (not replicated in any earlier actions) about the most
recent change in the target υn. As earlier, x¯n−1 is the average action in the observation pool. It
is somewhat arbitrary whether to define the error in x¯n−1 with respect to θn−1, its contemporary
optimal action, or with respect to θn, the target that x¯n−1 will be used to predict. We choose the
former, defining κmtn−1 = E
³
(x¯n−1 − θn−1)2
´
. Because x¯n−1 − θn = (x¯n−1 − θn−1) − υn, it follows
that the squared error of x¯n−1 with respect to θn is E
³
(x¯n−1 − θn)2
´
= κmtn−1 + vmt. For an agent
in cohort n, the errors (sni − θn) and (x¯n−1 − θn) are independent, so her optimal estimate of θn
puts weight αn = κ
mt
n−1+vmt
κmtn−1+vmt+v on her idiosyncratic signal. As before, the mean action of cohort n
agents is xn = αnsn + (1− αn) x¯n−1 (with sn = θn + εn), and the mean action in the observation
pool updates according to x¯n = (1− αn/Pn) x¯n−1+(αn/Pn) sn. Together these imply that the error
in the observation pool updates according to
κmtn =
µ
1− αn
Pn
¶2
(κn−1 + vmt) +
µαn
Pn
¶2
vc , or equivalently,
γn =
µ
1− αn
Pn
¶2
γn−1 +
µαn
Pn
¶2
vc + vmt , with αn = γnγn + v
where we define γn = κn + vmt = E
³
(x¯n−1 − θn)2
´
.
Clearly, there is no hope of complete learning in this setting; given the persistent change in the
target, observing past actions x¯n−1 can never shed light on the most recent change υn in the optimal
action. At best, γn could converge to vmt, in which case the value of observing past actions (to
newly arriving agents) is eventually stationary. At worst, γn could diverge, in which case newly
arriving agents will eventually give up on observational information entirely and rely exclusively on
their private signals (αn → 1).
Proposition 9 If Pn → N∗ > 1, then γn → γ∗N∗ > vmt. If Pn is unbounded, then γn diverges.
As expected, stale information in the observation pool makes it substantially harder to learn
about a moving target. If old actions die oﬀ at least exponentially (that is, lnλnm ∝ −n as in the
bounded population case), then paying attention to past actions is always worthwhile: in the long
run, agents put a weight of vγ∗
N∗+v
on ‘precedent,’ and their expected utility tends toward − γ∗N∗γ∗N+vv.
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If old actions die oﬀ more slowly that this (Pn unbounded) then the current target drifts away
from the observation pool over time, and in the long run, agents ignore precedent, use only their
idiosyncratic information, and earn payoﬀs tending toward −v. The rate at which the environment
is changing, as summarized by vmt, also aﬀects learning, but it plays a secondary role. The limit
γ∗N∗ is increasing in vmt, so if old actions are purged suﬃciently fast, then slower drift in the target
implies that agents can put more weight on precedent and earn higher long run utility than they
would if vmt were larger. However, if old actions are more persistent, any drift in the target drives
their long run payoﬀs down to −v.40
One could interpret the heterogeneity and moving target extensions in this section as represent-
ing, respectively, transient and persistent shocks to the optimal decision. One natural intermediate
case, which we will not treat, arises when the optimal decision varies according to an autoregressive
process. The challenge in this case (and the reason that we do not pursue it) is that there does not
appear to be a way to avoid representing the equations of motion with a set of state variables that
grows with n.
6 Non-uniform Exit of Old Actions
While our uniform exit condition has proven to be convenient, there is no compelling reason that the
persistence of old actions could not take some other form. In this section, we drop this condition in
two examples and show that the principle of slow learning is robust. Without uniform exit, a curse
of dimensionality arises: one must keep track of the composition of all past observation pools, and
in general this would require a state variable whose size grows with n.41 Our examples focus on the
situation in which an agent observes mainly the preceding cohort’s action, tainted by some earlier
actions. We avoid the curse of dimensionality by looking at cases in which almost all past cohorts
are treated identically, which allows learning to be described by only two or three state variables of
fixed size. In the first example, the first ‘founding’ cohort’s action is the only confounder; other old
actions are not persistent. In the second example, almost all old actions disappear immediately, but
a small fraction of them remain observable indefinitely. The examples make it clearer that it is not
uniform exit that drives slow learning — a vanishing but non-zero chance that an action is observed
indefinitely far into the future can suﬃce.
6.1 Example: Only One Action Persists
In some settings, the very first decisions made may enjoy a special prominence. For example, early
adopters of a new medical technique may receive a burst of media attention simply for being first.
Then an agent facing the same decision later on may be disproportionately exposed to these first
40We also have γ∗N∗ → ∞ as N∗ → ∞, so there is a smooth transition between the bounded and unbounded
population cases. Both of these comparative static conclusions are derived implicitly from the cubic equation that
defines γ∗N∗ . (See the proof of Proposition 9). A closed form for γ∗N∗ is available, but unilluminating.
41At stage n, one would need the composition of Pn−1 (an n−1 element vector), of Pn−2 (an n−2 element vector),
and so forth.
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actions if (for example) she carries out an internet search. In this section we model this idea by
assuming that only the action of cohort 1 persists, while other old actions disappear immediately.
Specifically, we assume that cohort n’s observational signal blends the most recent action xn−1 and
the first action x1:
x¯n−1 = (1− wn−1)xn−1 + wn−1x1
where {wn} is an exogenous sequence of weights (with wn ∈ [0, 1]). As usual, the fact that agents
observe an average of recent and ‘original’ actions may be interpreted either literally, or as shorthand
for an assumption that agents are exposed to many (undated) individual actions but store only a
mental summary statistic as a way to cope with data overload.
A second purpose of studying this extreme case is to understand whether it is possible for a single
cohort’s persistent influence to slow down learning. With this in mind, let us define the cumulative
persistence of a cohort 1 actions to be
P∞
n=1wn. (This is the natural extension of the definition
introduced in Section 3.3.) In the interest of brevity, the results here are informal, and we focus on
two illustrative cases.
Case 1: After a finite time, the first actors’ choices are never observed.
More precisely, suppose that wn is equal to one for all n ≤ K−1 and zero for all n ≥ K, for some
finite K > 1. Thus, agents in cohorts 2 through K observe only x1, but not more recent actions.
From cohort K + 1 on, an agent observes the most recent action, unmuddled by any confounding
eﬀect from x1. In this case, it is not hard to see that learning must be at rate n, regardless of how
large K is. Suppose that we set aside the actions of cohorts 2 through K − 1, and relabel cohort K
as 2˜, cohort K + 1 as 3˜, and so on. Then we have cohort 2˜ observing action x1, cohort 3˜ observing
x2˜, cohort 4˜ observing x3˜, and so on, with cohort ]n+ 1 observing xn˜, where n˜ = n −K + 1. But
this is just the case in which every cohort observes its immediate predecessor, and so we know that
learning is at rate n˜. In this case, the only eﬀect of cohort 1’s persistence is to stall learning for K
stages. As long as K is finite, this has no lasting eﬀect on the speed of learning.
Case 2: The first actors’ choices exit gradually.
For convenience, we consider weight sequences of the form wn = 1/na, for a > 0. As usual, we
define κn−1 as the expected squared error in x¯n−1. Recalling that the expected squared error in x1
is vc, we can write κn−1 recursively as:
κn−1 = (1− wn−1)2 var (xn−1) + 2wn−1 (1−wn−1) ρn−1 + w2n−1vc .
In this expression, the second term with ρn−1 ≡ E ((x1 − θ) (xn−1 − θ)) represents the persistent
influence of the first-movers’ signal error on the most recent action. The third term represents
the direct eﬀect of first-mover error on learning. Although this direct eﬀect does limit learning in
principle (κn cannot shrink faster than w2n), as usual it is the indirect eﬀect that really applies the
brakes. The full equations of motion for this model (including ρn) are derived in the appendix.
Result 1 If first-mover influence disappears fast enough (a ≥ 32), then learning is fast (κn → 0 at
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rate n). If first-mover influence disappears more slowly (a < 32), then learning is at rate
³
1
wn
´ 2
3
=
n
2
3
a.
We designate this a “result” on the basis of (i) a persuasive but semi-rigorous analysis of the
equations of motion (also in the appendix) and (ii) compelling computational evidence.42 Figure
1(a) shows log plots of lnκn versus lnn for the first 100,000 cohorts, for a range of values of a (from
0.3 to 1.8, in increments of 0.3). The curves are clearly close to linear for n large enough. For
each curve, if its slope tends to a constant, then that constant must be the rate of learning (as a
power of n).43 Figure 1(b) plots these slopes rn ≡ ¯¯∆ lnκn∆ lnn ¯¯ (where ∆ lnκn = lnκn − lnκn−1 and
∆ lnn = lnn−ln (n− 1)). Consistent with Result 1, these slopes appear to converge tomin ¡23a, 1¢.44
To put this result in context, recall Corollary 1. In loose terms, Corollary 1 says that if cohort
1 actions exit out of the observation pool à la {wn} — and (this is the uniform exit condition) all
subsequent cohorts also disappear at a similar rate — then learning slows to rate ln (1/wn). Result
1 suggests that if only one cohort persists in this way, learning still slows down, but not as much
(rate (1/wn)
2/3).
Next consider the cumulative persistence of cohort 1.45 For Case 1, this is finite and simply equal
to K. For Case 2, the cumulative persistence is finite whenever a > 1, and infinite otherwise. Here
as in Section 3.3, finite cumulative persistence does not guarantee fast learning: if a ∈ ¡1, 32¢, the
direct impact of the first actions is bounded but the speed of learning is still slow. Furthermore, since
K was arbitrary, one can easily create scenarios in which cumulative persistence is higher in Case 1
than in Case 2, yet the speed of learning is slower in Case 2. The cumulative persistence measure’s
main deficiency is failing to account for the fact that blending an old action into the observational
signal can do more damage in later stages, when the precision of the old action is much worse
than that of the rest of the observational signal. When n is large, an agent correctly expects her
observational signal to be good, and rationally puts high weight on it relative to her idiosyncratic
signal. A small amount of pollution from x1 at this stage will be particularly over-influential, since
it will be treated with a deference that it does not deserve.
42The analysis in the appendix points toward a proof, but there are technicalities that would appear to require
considerable spilling of ink. The plots below are exemplary; computations with other parameters are also consistent
with Result 1.
43To be a bit more precise,
ln (κnnr) = lnκ1 +
nX
m=2
(r − rn)∆ lnn .
So if κn → 0 at rate nr, for some r, then rn must converge to r.
44For smaller a (specifically a = 0.3 and a = 0.6 here), although the diﬀerence 2
3
a − rn is small from the start, it
appears to shrink rather slowly. For a = 1.8, the fact that rn rises briefly above 1 — suggesting that κn shrinks faster
than rate n1 for a time — may seem to violate the constraint that learning cannot be faster than the full information
rate obtained by pooling signals, which is rate n. There is no contradiction — κn is always strictly greater than vcn .
The transient phase when rn > 1 arises because the gap
¡κn − vcn ¢ between actual and full information errors ‘burns
oﬀ ’ quickly as wn shrinks.
45 I thank a referee for suggesting this possible line of demarcation between fast and slow learning.
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Figure 1: Learning when only cohort 1 actions are persistent. Cohort 1 actions exit as wn = n−a,
for six diﬀerent values of a, ranging from 0.3 (lightest curve) to 1.8 (darkest curve), in increments
of 0.3. Parameters v = 2, vc = 1, first 105 cohorts computed.
6.2 Example: Hyperbolic Exit
To motivate the example, suppose that before cohort n acts, a government statistical agency pub-
lishes what it intends to be xn−1, the average action in the most recent cohort. However, in the
agency’s database, a small fraction of past actions are entered with a missing “date” field, and due
to a programming error, these actions are included in the published statistic.
Formally, define yn to be the (equally weighted) average of actions x1 through xn. An agent in
cohort n receives the observational signal x¯n−1 = βxn−1 + (1− β) yn−2, where we will think of β as
close to one and 1− β as the error rate. Under these assumptions, the share of action xn−1 in the
observational signal falls from β in cohort n, to 1−βn−1 in cohort n + 1, then to 1−βn in cohort n + 2,
and so on. Because an action’s share declines dramatically at first, then more gradually, we refer
to this as hyperbolic exit (by way of analogy with hyperbolic discounting). Notice that if β = 0,
so that x¯n−1 = yn−2, we are almost back to the version of our baseline model in which dn is set
to zero. In that case, each agent observes an unweighted average of her predecessors, and learning
is at rate lnn. One can think of this example as an extension of that case in which the weight on
non-immediate predecessors is dialed down arbitrarily low.
In this case, an analysis of learning requires three state variables: we define νn = var (x¯n),
ωn = var (yn), and ρn = cov (x¯n, yn), where νn takes on the role of our measure of social learning.
Because the expressions involved become lengthy, for this part we make the simplifying assumption
that v = vc = 1. An agent in cohort n then puts weight αn = νn−11+νn−1 on her own signal, and weight
1− αn on x¯n−1. Using this, we can write the following diﬀerence equations for the evolution of x¯n
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and yn:
yn =
αn
n
sn +
n− 1
n
yn−1 +
1− αn
n
x¯n−1 (9)
x¯n = αnβsn + (1− β) yn−1 + (1− αn)βx¯n−1 (10)
Learning depends on the evolution of the covariance matrix of x¯n and yn (that is, ωn, νn, and ρn),
which can be derived from (9) and (10). These equations of motion are relegated to the appendix,
but we will make a few remarks about them.
Remark 2 If β = 1, then the model reduces to PA with immediate exit, and social learning is at
rate n. If β = 0, the model is essentially the same as model PA with no exit (dn = 0), and social
learning is at rate lnn.46
One might expect an intermediate rate of learning when β ∈ (0, 1). On the one hand, mixing
old actions into the public signal degrades its precision (relative to the immediate exit case). In
particular, the precision of x¯n cannot grow faster than that of yn.47 However, the old actions
contained in yn should be more precise (compared to the no exit case) because they will have relied
more heavily on their own recent predecessors. (That is, just as the influence of yn drags down
the rate at which νn improves, the influence of x¯n may pull up the rate at which ωn improves.)
Proposition 10 refutes this compromise intuition: if β < 1, then the influence of old actions dominates
and learning is at rate lnn. To simplify the proof, consider “test sequences” of the form Rn (a) ≡Pn
m=1 rn (a), where rn (a) = n
a−1. For a ∈ (0, 1], Rn (a) grows as na, while Rn (0) grows as lnn.
Proposition 10 In the model with hyperbolic exit, suppose that ωn, νn, and ρn all converge to zero
at common rate Rn (a) for some a ≥ 0. If β = 1, then a = 1. If β < 1, then a = 0. That is,
learning is at rate n if agents can observe only their immediate predecessors but only logarithmic in
n if there is any persistence from earlier actions.
Proposition 10 is couched narrowly and could probably be weakened. In particular, careful study
of the equations of motion suggests that if β < 1, then (lnn)ωn, (lnn) νn, and (lnn) ρn all must
converge to 1−β2 , but we will not attempt a proof of this. The result provides further confirmation
that the tail behavior of noise from prior actions is critical to the speed of learning. Here, even when
1− β is small, these tails are fat. For example, at stage n, noise from actions more than n/2 stages
old comprises roughly a fraction 1−β2 of the observation pool, regardless of n. No matter how small
1− β is, eventually the cumulative influence from these fat tails slows down learning.
7 Concluding Remarks
At its heart, social learning asks how eﬀective people can be at pooling their individual information.
The question is most interesting — and most realistic — when there are constraints on learning from
46 In contrast with the dn = 0 case of model PA, xn−1 is omitted from the average that cohort n sees, but this is
inessential.
47Specifically, we have νn ≥ (1− β)2 ωn−1, which follows from the (1− β) yn−1 term in (10).
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others. One such constraint, which inspired the herding literature, is that sometimes people may
observe others’ choices but not the beliefs that led to them. Another constraint, which is the focus
of this paper, is that people may see a summary of others’ choices, such as aggregate sales data,
or a statistic on the news. A summary such as this will often do a poor job of summarizing the
information content of others’ choices. The data that an observer would need to form a better
summary is not just the individual choices, but also their context : when each choice was made,
which prior choices it relied on, and so forth. We show that when people learn from summaries of
past actions, they cannot correct for a type of echo chamber eﬀect (recent actions rely on older ones)
that tends to give the earliest actions too much influence. This inertia can slow learning down so
much that, for practical purposes, it is eﬀectively incomplete. The inertial eﬀect of old actions grows
more pernicious in a changing world (the moving target model), but it can also become beneficial
(e.g., with heterogeneous tastes, or a self reliance bias) when a decisionmaker wishes her samplees
had paid more heed to the past.
Our model can also be applied if people observe others’ actions individually but treat them
equally in forming a mental summary statistic. Equal treatment might arise because contextual
information is missing (as we suggest in our sample average model). Another rationale, not pursued
in this paper, is that people have clues about context but either underestimate the need to correct
for correlation among the actions they sample or find it too diﬃcult. In this case, forming a sample
average could be a cognitively simple rule of thumb.
For savvy learners with partial context on the choices they see, the first order correction would
be to try to discount older choices, since their information is likely to be redundant. In this sense, a
higher (exogenous) frequency of sampling recent versus old choices in our model could be interpreted
as a proxy for better information about context. As expected, social learning is faster when people
are able to collect observations with less redundancy. However, this reduced-form interpretation is
not a substitute for an explicit model of inference from partially ordered data. Further work along
these lines appears challenging, but would be welcome.48
Poor information about the dependencies among people’s choices is a problem for applied mi-
croeconomists as well as for the people they study. Certain aspects of our model (sequences of
cohorts of agents, normally distributed errors) bear a loose similarity to simple econometric models
of repeated cross-section data. While our model is not ready to estimate, it suggests a tractable
way to build modest assumptions about what people know into structural empirical models of social
learning.
Our analysis relies heavily on the tractability of continuous actions paired with normal errors.
Developing a similar model with discrete actions, such as the binary action models that have been
a workhorse of the herding literature, would seem to require substantially diﬀerent methods. That
48One intermediate approach, developed in an earlier version of this paper, is to retain the observation of a sample
average but to allow the agent to choose the composition of this sample (within certain constraints). This structure
is motivated by a screening story: for example our sprinter from the introduction might be able to screen older blogs
out of her sample based on hairstyles or dated pop culture references, just as she might be able to avoid blogs that
are more focused on distance running. One can show that agents generally prefer to screen for recent actions, but if
the screening technology is imperfect, the slow learning results in the paper still apply.
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said, there is no obvious reason why the factors that contribute to fast or slow learning in our
model would not play a roughly similar role if actions were discrete. Other adaptations are more
direct. For example, in our model, an agent’s action is his (posterior) point estimate of the unknown
parameter. Thus, it could be recast as a model of learning from others’ beliefs rather than from
their actions without changing the mathematics.49 Opportunities to observe summary statistics
about other people’s beliefs — in the form of prediction markets, online product ratings, and so forth
— have proliferated of late, and learning from the “wisdom of crowds” has seized the imagination
of the popular press.50 However, crowds and markets can also make mistakes and propagate stale
information.51 Our model provides a framework for thinking about how the wisdom of crowds may
sometimes be underwhelming due to the inertia of early mistakes.
References
[1] Daron Acemoglu, Munther Dahleh, Ilan Lobel, and Asuman Ozdaglar. Bayesian learning in
social networks. NBER Working Paper W14040, May 2008.
[2] Venkatesh Bala and Sanjeev Goyal. Learning from neighbours. Review of Economic Studies,
65(3):595—621, July 1998.
[3] Abhijit Banerjee. A simple model of herd behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
107(3):797—817, August 1992.
[4] Abhijit Banerjee and Drew Fudenberg. Word of mouth learning. Games and Economic Behav-
ior, 46:1—22, 2004.
[5] Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch. A theory of fads, fashion, custom,
and cultural change in informational cascades. Journal of Political Economy, 100(5):992—1026,
October 1992.
[6] Steven Callander and Johannes Horner. The wisdom of the minority. mimeo, 46, 2006.
[7] Bogachan Celen and Shachar Kariv. Observational learning under incomplete information.
Games and Economic Behavior, 47(1):72—86, 2004.
[8] Peter DeMarzo, Dimitri Vayanos, and Jeﬀrey Zwiebel. Persuasion bias, social influence and
uni-dimensional opinions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3):909—968, 2003.
49We refer to agents’ beliefs after acting but before utility is realized, which is reasonable for decisions, like investment
in education, for which the payoﬀ is deferred. Adapting the model to reflect learning from agents’ beliefs after realizing
utility would not be much more trouble. The main change is that we would need to specify what an agent can learn
from her utility outcome, an issue that is irrelevant in the standard interpretation of our model.
50For example, see [18].
51 In one piquant example of how old and new information may be jumbled, on September 8, 2008, United Airline’s
stock price tumbled over 75% upon reports of an impending bankruptcy filing [14]. Sheepish investors soon discovered
that the impetus for the sell-oﬀ had been a six year old news story that had accidentally been labeled as current. The
mistake generated a wealth transfer that was probably in the neighborhood of $100 million.
32
[9] Esther Duflo and Emmanuel Saez. The role of information and social interactions in retirement
plan decisions: Evidence from a randomized experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
118(3):815—842, August 2003.
[10] Glenn Ellison and Drew Fudenberg. Rules of thumb for social learning. Journal of Political
Economy, 101(4):612—643, 1993.
[11] Glenn Ellison and Drew Fudenberg. Word-of-mouth communication and social learning. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 110(1):93—125, 1995.
[12] Gunther Eysenbach, John Powell, Oliver Kuss, and Eun-Ryoung Sa. Empirical studies assessing
the quality of health information for consumers on the world wide web. JAMA: The Journal
of the American Medical Association, 287(20):2691—2700, May 22/29, 2002.
[13] Jacob Goeree, Robert McKelvey, Thomas Palfrey, and Brian Rogers. Self-correcting information
cascades. Review of Economic Studies, 74(3):733—62, July 2007.
[14] Micheline Maynard. A mistaken news report hurts united. New York Times, September 8 2008.
[15] Kaivan Munshi. Social learning in a heterogeneous population: technology diﬀusion in the
indian green revolution. Journal of Development Economics, 73(1):185 — 213, 2004.
[16] Lones Smith and Peter Sorensen. Pathological outcomes of observational learning. Economet-
rica, 68(2):371—398, March 2000.
[17] Lones Smith and Peter Sorensen. Rational social learning with random sampling. mimeo, 2008.
[18] James Surowiecki. The Wisdom of Crowds. 2004.
[19] Xavier Vives. How fast do rational agents learn? Review of Economic Studies, 60(2):329—47,
April 1993.
[20] Georg Weizsäcker. Do we follow others when we should? a simple test of rational expectations.
American Economic Review, 100(5):2340—60, December 2010.
8 Proofs
Any omitted proofs appear in the Supplementary Appendix. Many of the proofs use the following standard
result, due to Stolz and Cesàro, which can be thought of as a generalization of L’Hôpital’s rule to discrete
summations.
Theorem 1 Let {An} and {Bn} be two sequences of real numbers, with {Bn} strictly increasing and un-
bounded. If the limit
lim
n→∞
An+1−An
Bn+1−Bn = K
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exists, then the limit limn→∞ AnBn also exists and is equal to K.
Corollary 3 Suppose that {An} and {Bn} satisfy Theorem 1 with limit K. Define an = An+1 − An and
bn = Bn+1 −Bn. Let {Cn} be strictly increasing and unbounded, with increments cn = Cn+1 − Cn. Suppose
that
lim
n→∞
an −Kbn
cn
= L
Then limn→∞ An−KBnCn exists and is equal to L.
Proof. This is a direct application of the theorem.
Proposition 1
Start with d˜ and Pn. Since dn is assumed to converge, let dn → d¯. As the population Pn is weakly
increasing, d˜ > 0 implies d¯ > 0 and Pn converges to a finite limit. Conversely, Pn → N∗ <∞ implies dn 9 0,
so d˜ = d¯N∗ > 0. For Part 2, d˜ = 0 implies that either Pn → ∞, or d¯ = 0 (which in turn implies Pn → ∞).
Conversely, since dn ∈ [0, 1], we have Pn →∞ implies dnPn → 0.
Next for arbitrary m, observe that all cohort m agents remain in Pm to be seen by cohort m+1 agents. A
measure dmPm exit after cohort m+1 leaving 1− dmPm in Pm+1. Of these, a fraction dm+1Pm+1 leave after cohort m+2
acts, leaving a total of
³
1− dmPm
´³
1− dm+1Pm+1
´
in Pm+2. Thus we have #m+1m = 1 and #
n
m =
Qn−2
k=m
³
1− dkPk
´
for n ≥ m+2. For properties EE1 and SE1 it suﬃces to look at the limit of ln#nmn , since nn−m → 1 with n. We
have ln#
n
m
n =
1
n
Pn−2
k=m ln
³
1− dkPk
´
. Now apply Theorem 1 to get limn→∞ ln#
n
m
n = limn→∞ ln
³
1− dnPn
´
, if the
latter limit exists. We have dn ∈ [0, 1] and Pn ≥ 1, so d˜ = limn→∞ dnPn ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, d˜ = 1 is possible
only if dn = 1 for all n, a case that has been ruled out. Thus we have limn→∞ ln#
n
m
n = ln
³
1− d˜
´
≤ 0. Notice
that this limit does not depend on m.
Because the fraction of cohort m actions in the observation pool observed by cohort n is λnm = #nm/Pn−1,
we have limn→∞ lnλ
n
m
n = ln
³
1− d˜
´
− limn→∞ lnPnn . But Pn is bounded above by n, so limn→∞ lnPnn = 0.
Thus limn→∞ ln#
n
m
n = limn→∞
lnλnm
n = ln
³
1− d˜
´
for all m, which implies EE1 ⇔ EE2 and SE1 ⇔ SE2.
Finally observe that ln
³
1− d˜
´
< 0⇔ d˜ > 0 and ln
³
1− d˜
´
= 0⇔ d˜ = 0, which completes the proof.
Proposition 2
Part 1: κn→ 0 at rate Rn
Let Rn =
Pn
m=1
1
Pn
and τ¯n = 1κn as in the text and define zn = τ¯nRn = 1Rnκn . We will apply the
Stolz—Cesàro Theorem to the increments of τ¯n and Rn. First note that Rn is strictly increasing and un-
bounded. (This follows from the fact that 1 ≤ Pn≤ n, so Rn grows at least as fast as the harmonic series
1
1+
1
2+...+
1
n+...) We can write τ¯1 = 1 and
τ¯n − τ¯n−1 = Mnτ¯n−1
vτ¯n−1 + 1−Mn (11)
Let
Kn =
τ¯n−τ¯n−1
Rn−Rn−1=
PnMnτ¯n−1
vτ¯n−1+1−Mn
=
µ
2− 1
Pn
vc+κn−1
v + κn−1
¶µ τ¯n−1
vτ¯n−1+1−Mn
¶
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To prove zn → 0 at rate Rn, it will suﬃce to show thatKn → K for some strictly positiveK, and therefore (by
the Stolz—Cesàro Theorem) that zn → K as well. To show this, first observe that the first term in parentheses
is strictly positive (because Pn≥ 1 and vc≤ v), strictly increasing (because 1Pn is weakly decreasing and κn
strictly decreasing implies vc+κn−1v+κn−1 strictly decreasing), and bounded above; thus it converges to a strictly
positive limit. This also implies that Mn converges to a weakly positive limit; define M by {Mn}→M . For
the second term in parentheses, note that τ¯n is strictly increasing (because κn is strictly decreasing) and either
bounded (in which case τ¯n converges) or unbounded. In either case, (τ¯n converges or grows without bound),
the second term in parentheses converges. Its limit is strictly positive because τ¯n−1vτ¯n−1+1−Mn≥ τ¯n−1vτ¯n−1+1≥ 1v+1
(where the last step uses τ¯n ≥ 1). Thus Kn → K, with K strictly positive. Because this implies that τ¯n
tends to infinity , the limiting constant is K = 2v − vcv2 limn→∞ (1/Pn). (The limit of 1/Pn exists regardless
of whether Pn is bounded.)
Part 2: Interpreting rate Rn learning
Let f(n) be an arbitrary function on the natural numbers, and let ∆fn= f(n)− f(n− 1). Apply
Theorem 1 to get limn→∞Rn/f(n)= limn→∞1/(Pn∆fn), if the latter limit exists. Use f(n) = n to get
limn→∞Rn/n= limn→∞1/Pn which is either strictly positive and finite or zero, depending on whether the ob-
servation pool is bounded or unbounded. Next suppose that dn is uniformly bounded away from 1. By assump-
tion, dn converges, so suppose dn→ 1− g¯, with g¯ > 0. Set f(n) = lnn to get limn→∞lnn/Rn= − limn→∞Pnln(1− 1/n).
Write the expression in the last limit as Pnln(1− 1/n) = (Pn/n)(n ln(1− 1/n)). But by assumption, limn→∞(Pn/n) = g¯,
while limn→∞(n ln(1− 1/n)) = −1, so limn→∞lnn/Rn= g¯.
Lemmas 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are used in the proof of Proposition 3. Their proofs appear in the Supplementary
Appendix.
Lemma 2 (Second order convergence rates) Suppose τ¯nRn → K, with η = 1Kv as in the text. Let Hn =Pn
j=1
1
P2j
if Pn is unbounded and RnPn diverges, or Hn =
Pn
j=1
1
RjPj
otherwise. Then τ¯n−KRnHn → L, for some
finite L. Furthermore, RnHn (ηv − κnRn)→ L (ηv)2 and RnHn (η − αnRn)→ Lη2v.
Lemma 3 RnPn ≥ n for all n ≥ 1.
Lemma 4 (Discrete approximation of lnRn) Define Sn =
Pn
k=1
1
RkPk
. The sequence {Sn − lnRn}n≥1 con-
verges.
Lemma 5 (Linear approximation of ln (1− αn/Pn)) Define ck by ln (1− αk/Pk) = −αk/Pk + ck. For arbi-
trary m > 1, the sum
P∞
k=m+1 ck converges.
Lemma 6 For arbitrary m ≥ 1 and q ∈ (0, 1), the sum P∞k=m+1 1R2−qk Pk converges.
Proposition 3
Part 1 Fix any arbitrary m and let λ˜ (n) = lnλn+1m . Following the text, we can write
λ˜ (n) = − lnPm +
nX
k=m+1
ln
µ
1− 1
Pk
¶
Wemust show that
n λ˜(n)
Rn
o
n>m
→ −L, for some L > 0. By Theorem 1, it suﬃces to show that
n λ˜(n)−λ˜(n−1)
Rn−Rn−1
o
n>m+1
=
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n
Pn ln
³
1− 1Pn
´o
n>m+1
→ −L. If Pn is bounded then it converges to some N∗ > 1, and the result follows
directly. If Pn is unbounded, then the result follows from limx→0 1x ln (1− x) = −1.
Part 2 Define η = ¡2− vcv limn→∞(1/Pn)¢−1 as in the text. Observe from the proof of Proposition 2
that {κnRn}n≥1 → ηv and {αnRn}n≥1 → η. It suﬃces to show that the sequence {ln (πnm (Rn)η)}n>m
converges, or equivalently that {π˜ (n) + η lnRn}n>m converges, where π˜ (n) = lnπn+1m = ln (αm/Pm) +Pn
k=m+1 ln (1− αk/Pk). The strategy is to approximate lnRn by Sn =
Pn
k=1
1
RkPk
and approximatePn
k=m+1 ln (1− αk/Pk) by −
Pn
k=m+1 αk/Pk. That is, we have
ln (πnm (Rn)η) =
nX
k=m+1
µ η
RkPk
− αk
Pk
¶
+Error1n +Error
2
n + C
where Error1n = η
³
lnRn −Pnk=m+1 1RkPk´, Error2n =Pnk=m+1 ³αkPk + ln³1− αkPk´´, and C is a (bounded)
constant that does not depend on n. The sequences
©
Error1n
ª
n>m
and
©
Error2n
ª
n>m
converge by Lemmas 4
and 5, so to prove Part 2, it suﬃces to show that the sumP∞k=m+1 ak converges, where ak = 1RkPk (η − αkRk).
This will depend on second order eﬀects in the speed of learning — namely, whether αkRk tends to η fast
enough. Lemma 2 answers this question; we have RnHn (η − αnRn) → L˜, for some finite constant L˜ and a
sequence Hn defined by Hn =
Pn
j=1
1
P2j
if Pn is unbounded and RnPn diverges, or Hn =
Pn
j=1
1
RjPj
other-
wise. Let a0k = Hk/
¡
R2kPk
¢
, and observe that limk→∞ ak/a0k = L˜. By the limit comparison test, to proveP∞
k=m+1 ak convergent (and therefore to prove Part 2), it suﬃces to show that
P∞
k=m+1 a
0
k converges. There
are two cases to consider, depending on which part of the piecewise definition of Hn applies.
Part 2, Case 1: Pn is either bounded, or Rn/Pn converges. Thus Hn =
Pn
j=1
1
RjPj
.
By Lemma 4, Hn/ lnRn → 1, so by another application of the limit comparison test, it suﬃces to
show that
P∞
k=m+1
lnRk
R2kPk
converges. Write this sum as
P∞
k=m+1
³
1
R2−qk Pk
´³
lnRk
Rqk
´
for an arbitrary constant
q ∈ (0, 1). We have limk→∞ lnRkRqk = 0 (since Rk →∞ with k), so it will suﬃce to show that
P∞
k=m+1
1
R2−qk Pk
converges. Lemma 6 shows this, completing this part of the proof. The spirit of Lemma 6 is to note that the
summand may be written (∆Rk)Rq−2k , which is something like the ‘derivative’ of Rq−1k . Thus we may expect
the summation to behave like the ‘definite integral’ Rq−1m − limk→∞Rq−1k = Rq−1m . Lemma 6 formalizes this
intuition.
Part 2, Case 2: Pn is unbounded and Rn/Pn diverges. Thus Hn =
Pn
j=1
1
P 2j
.
This is the only case where we must rely on condition (Poly). By (Poly), n−bPn converges to a strictly
positive, finite limit. It is straightforward to use this fact, with applications of Theorem 1, to show that
nb−1Rn and n2b−1Hn also converge to strictly positive finite limits. Together these imply that our summand
a0k tends to zero at rate k
1+b. (That is, k1+ba0k converges to a strictly positive, finite limit.) But then,
convergence of
P∞
k=m+1
Hk
R2kPk
is implied by the fact that the sum
P∞
k=m+1
1
k1+b
converges.
Part 3 This follows more or less immediately from Part 2. By Part 2, for any cohort m, there exists some
Lm > 0 such that {πnm (Rn)η}n>m → Lm. By Proposition 2, 1κn−1Rn−1 converges to K = 1ηv . Furthermore,
Rn
Rn−1 =
Rn
Rn− 1Pn
→ 1 since Rn →∞ and 1Pn ≤ 1. Thus we can write
χnm (Rn)2η−1 =
µ
vc
κn−1Rn−1
¶µ
Rn−1
Rn
¶
(πnm (Rn)η)2
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Each term in parentheses on the righthand side converges to a positive limit, so
n
χnm (Rn)2η−1
o
n>m
does
as well. Parts 3a and 3b are merely a matter of emphasis. If Pn → N∗ < ∞, then 2η − 1 = 22− vcv 1N∗ − 1 =
vc
2vN∗−vc > 0. However, if Pn → ∞, then 2η − 1 = 0, so in this case, χnm tends toward a positive limit as
n→∞.
Lemma 1
Label the individual actions that comprise xS(ni) as {y1, y2, ..., yS}, so xS(ni) = 1S
PK
k=1 yk. The expected
squared error in xS(ni) can be written as
κ¯n−1 = 1
S2
E
⎛
⎝
Ã
SX
s=1
(ys − θ)
!2⎞
⎠
=
1
S2
Ã
SX
s=1
E
³
(ys − θ)2
´
+ 2
SX
s=1
SX
s0=s+1
E ((ys − θ) (ys0 − θ))
!
=
1
S
κˆn−1 + S − 1
S
ρˆn−1
Agent ni’s optimal weight αˆn solves
αˆn = argmin
a
E
³¡
asni + (1− a)xS(ni) − θ
¢2´
Because sni and xS(ni) are independent, conditional on θ, the minimand can be written as
a2E
³
(sni − θ)2
´
+ (1− a)2E
³¡
xS(ni) − θ
¢2´
= a2v + (1− a)2 κ¯n−1
from which the optimal weight follows.
Proposition 5
As a preliminary step, we compute the increments of κˆn and ρˆn:
∆κˆn = κˆn − κˆn−1 = − 1
Pn
(κˆn−1 − αˆnv)
∆ρˆn = ρˆn − ρˆn−1 = − αˆnρˆn−1Pn
µ
2− 1
Pn
αˆn
ρˆn−1
¡ρˆn−1 + vc¢¶
Use the definitions of αˆn and κ¯n to write ∆κˆn as:
∆κˆn = − 1
Pn
1
κ¯n−1 + v
µ
κˆ2n−1 + S − 1S
¡κˆn−1 − ρˆn−1¢ (v − κˆn−1)¶ or
= − 1
Pn
κˆn−1
κ¯n−1 + v
µ
1
S
κˆn−1 + S − 1
S
µ
v
µ
1− ρˆn−1κˆn−1
¶
+ ρˆn−1
¶¶
The following three supporting lemmas are proved in the Supplementary Appendix.
Lemma 7 κˆnρˆn is bounded. (That is, ρˆn tends to zero no faster than κˆn.)
Lemma 8 1ρˆnRn is bounded. (That is, ρˆn tends to zero no faster than rate Rn.)
Lemma 9 At least one of the following must hold: either κˆn−ρˆnρˆn → 0 or (κˆn − ρˆn)Rn → 0.
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Lemmas 7 and 8 put upper bounds on how fast the error variance vanishes, while Lemma 9 puts a lower
bound on how fast the gap between κˆn and ρˆn must shrink. By Lemma 9, we either have κˆn−ρˆnρˆn → 0, in
which case the proof is complete, or else (κˆn − ρˆn)Rn → 0 holds. In the latter case we can write κˆn−ρˆnρˆn =
((κˆn − ρˆn)Rn)
³
1
ρˆnRn
´
. Because the first term tends to zero and the second is bounded, we have κˆn−ρˆnρˆn → 0
for this case as well, which completing the proof.
Proposition 6
S > 1
To show that ρˆnRn tends to a positive constant, we follow the proof of Lemma 8, adding the additional
information (from Proposition 5) that κˆn−ρˆnρˆn → 0. We have
lim
n→∞
1
ρˆnRn = limn→∞
∆
³
1
ρˆn
´
∆Rn = limn→∞
ρˆn−1
ρˆn
αˆn
ρˆn−1
µ
2− 1
Pn
αˆn
ρˆn−1
¡ρˆn−1 + vc¢¶
On the righthand side, αˆnρˆn−1 =
1
κ¯n−1+v
ρˆn−1+ 1S (κˆn−1−ρˆn−1)
ρˆn−1 → 1v . Furthermore, we have
ρˆnρˆn−1 =
³
1− αˆnPn
´2
+
αˆn αˆnρˆn−1 vcP2n → 1 (because αˆn → 0). Thus we have
lim
n→∞
1
ρˆnRn = limn→∞
∆
³
1
ρˆn
´
∆Rn =
1
v
µ
2− vc
v
lim
n→∞
1
Pn
¶
=
1
ηv
Thus ρˆn → 0 at rate Rn. From this, it follows immediately that κˆnRn tends to the same limit as ρˆnRn, while
αˆnRn → 1v limn→∞ ρˆnRn.
S = 1
If S = 1, then αˆn = κˆn−1κˆn−1+v and so κˆn is characterized by
∆κˆn = − 1
Pn
(κˆn−1 − αˆnv) = − 1
Pn
κˆ2n−1
κˆn−1 + v
Apply Theorem 1 to 1/κˆnRn , with ∆ (1/κˆn) = ∆κˆnκˆnκˆn−1 to get
lim
n→∞
1
κˆn
Rn
= lim
n→∞
∆
³
1
κˆn
´
∆Rn = limn→∞
κˆn−1
κˆn
1
κˆn−1 + v =
1
v
where the last step uses κˆn−1κˆn → 1 (which follows from ∆κˆnκˆn−1 = − 1Pn κˆn−1κˆn−1+v → 0). Thus, κˆnRn → v.
For subsequent results, we use the following lemma. While the result is surely not novel, we have not
found this particular formulation in the literature.
Lemma 10 Define a sequence Zn by Z1 = Zinit > 0 and Zn = (1− bn−1)Zn−1 + cn−1 if n > 1. Write
the increments of this sequence as ∆Zn ≡ Zn − Zn−1 = −bn−1
³
Zn−1 − cn−1bn−1
´
. Suppose that bn and cn are
sequences with 0 < bn < 1 and
P∞
n=1 bn divergent, cn → 0, and cnbn → Z ≥ 0. Then Zn → Z.
Proposition 7
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Case 1 from Table 1: Pn is bounded with Pn → N∗
Let FP : [0, vc]→ [0, vc] be defined by FP (z) =
³
1− α(z)P
´2
z+
³α(z)
P
´2
vc, where α (z) = z+vtaz+vta+v . Notice
that κn = FPn ◦ FPn−1 ◦ ... ◦ FP2 (κ1). We claim the following, deferring proofs:
Claim (1) FP has a unique, strictly positive fixed point, denoted z¯P , satisfyingµ
2− α (z)
P
¶
z − α (z)
P
vc
¯¯¯¯
z=z¯P
= 0 (12)
Claim (2) There is a function bP (z), satisfying
α(0)
P < bP (z) < 1 for all z ∈ [0, vc], such that FP (z)−z¯P =
(1− bP (z)) ¡z − z¯P ¢.
Claim (3) Define z¯ ≡ z¯N∗ . We have ©z¯Pnª→ z¯.
A general intuition for the main result is that FPn tends to FN∗ , and iteration of FN∗ tends to z¯, so
κn → z¯. The proof is less direct. Define a variable ωn ≡ κn− z¯Pn+1 , and note that ωn = ¡FPn (κn−1)− z¯Pn¢+¡
z¯Pn − z¯Pn+1¢. Using Claim (2), we have
ωn = (1− bPn (κn−1))ωn−1 +
¡
z¯Pn − z¯Pn+1¢
= (1− bn−1)ωn−1 + cn−1 , setting bn−1 = bPn (κn−1) and cn−1 = z¯Pn − z¯Pn+1
Now apply Lemma 10. We have cn → 0 by Claim (3), P∞n=1 bn divergent by Claim (2) and the fact thatα(0)
Pn
→ α(0)N∗ > 0, and cnbn → 0. Thus the lemma applies, and so ωn → 0. Together with z¯Pn → z¯, this implies
that κn → z¯.
Proof of Claim (1) The equation FP (z) − z = 0 can easily be reduced to (12), which is quadratic in z.
FP (z) − z = 0 has one irrelevant negative solution (because FP (0) > 0 and limz→−(vta+v)+ FP (x) = −∞).
The remaining solution lies in (0, vc) (because FP (0) > 0 and FP (z)− z|z=vc < 0).
Proof of Claim (2) Using the definition of FP and some tedious algebra, for arbitrary z and z0 we can
eventually write:
FP (z)− FP (z0) =
µ
1− α (z)
P
¶2
(z − z0) + α (z)− α (z
0)
P
µα (z)
P
(z0 + vc) +
α (z0)
P
vc −
µ
2− α (z
0)
P
¶
z0
¶
Next observe that α (z)− α (z0) = v(z0+vta+v)(z+vta+v) (z − z0) = 1−α(z)z0+vta+v (z − z0). Use this to write:
FP (z)−FP (z0) =
Ãµ
1− α (z)
P
¶2
+
1
P
1− α (z)
z0 + vta + v
µα (z)
P
(z0 + vc) +
α (z0)
P
vc −
µ
2− α (z
0)
P
¶
z0
¶!
(z − z0)
Substitute in z0 = z¯P , and use (12) to cancel righthand side terms, arriving at:
FPn (z)− z¯P =
Ãµ
1− α (z)
P
¶2
+
v + z¯n
z¯n + vta + v
α (z) (1− α (z))
P 2
!¡
z − z¯P ¢
= (1− bP (z)) ¡z − z¯P ¢
Expand and solve for bP (z) to get:
bP (z) =
α (z)
P
µ
2− α (z)
P
− v + z¯
n
z¯n + vta + v
1− α (z)
P
¶
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Observe that bP (z) <
α(z)
P
³
2− α(z)P
´
≤ 1 (where the strict inequality follows from α (z) < 1). For the lower
bound on bP (z), we have
bP (z) >
α (z)
P
µ
2− 1
P
¶
>
α (0)
P
> 0
Proof of Claim (3) The quadratic equation that defines z¯P is continuous in P .
Cases 2 and 3 from Table 1: Pn is unbounded and limn→∞∆Pn < 2α¯
Recall that ∆Pn = 1 − dn converges because (by assumption) dn converges. Let g¯ = limn→∞∆Pn ≥ 0.
Let Zn = Pnκn. We have
Zn =
µ
1 +
∆Pn
Pn−1
¶µ
1− αn
Pn
¶2
Zn−1 +
α2n
Pn
vc
= (1− bn−1)Zn−1 + cn−1
where cn−1 = α
2
n
Pn
vc, and
bn−1 =
1
Pn−1
µ
2αn −∆Pn − α
2
n
Pn
¶
It is immediate that bn → 0 and cn → 0 because Pn diverges. Furthermore, we have cnbn → α¯
2vc
2α¯−g¯ which
is strictly positive and finite. Because α
2
n
Pn
→ 0, bn−1 is eventually bounded below by (e.g.) 12 2α¯−g¯Pn−1 . ButP∞
n=1
1
Pn
diverges, so
P∞
n=1 bn must diverge as well. Finally, there exists some n¯ such that bn−1 ∈ (0, 1) for
all n ≥ n¯. If we consider the sequence Zn beginning with the n¯th term Zn¯, all of the conditions of Lemma 10
are met, so we have Zn → α¯2vc2α¯−g¯ .
Case 4 from Table 1: Pn is unbounded and limn→∞∆Pn > 2α¯
Observe that in this case, limn→∞∆Pn = limn→∞ Pnn = g¯. Define Zn = Pβn κn. We have
Zn = P
β
n κn−1
µ
1− αn
Pn
¶2
+
α2n
P 2−βn
vc
=
Ã
1 +
∆P βn
P βn−1
− 2αn
P 1−βn P βn−1
+
α2n
P 2−βn P βn−1
!
Zn−1 +
α2n
P 2−βn
vc
and so
∆Zn =
Ã∆ ¡P βn ¢
Pβn−1
− 2αn
P 1−βn Pβn−1
+
α2n
P 2−βn Pβn−1
!
Zn−1 +
α2n
P 2−βn
vc
where ∆ ¡P βn ¢ = Pβn −Pβn−1. Expanding P βn = (Pn−1 +∆Pn)β , we have ∆ ¡P βn ¢ = β ∆PnP1−βn−1 +O
µ³ ∆Pn
Pn−1
´2−β¶
.
Since ∆Pn and αn converge, we have
∆Zn = 1
Pn−1
Ã
β∆Pn −
µ
Pn−1
Pn
¶1−β
2αn +O
³
P β−1n−1
´!
Zn−1 +O
¡
P β−2n
¢
=
1
Pn−1
µ
β∆Pn − 2αn +O
µ
1
Pn
¶¶
Zn−1 +O
¡
P β−2n
¢
(where the last step expands
³
Pn−1
Pn
´1−β
=
³
1− ∆PnPn
´1−β
).
For β ∈ (0, 1), the contribution of summedO ¡P β−2n ¢ terms to Zn converges becauseO ¡P β−2n ¢ = O ¡nβ−2¢
with β − 2 < −1. Thus we can concentrate on the term in ∆Zn that is proportional to Zn−1. Suppose that
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βg¯ − 2α¯ > ² > 0. Then for all n suﬃciently large, we have β∆Pn − 2αn +O
³
1
Pn
´
> ²2 and Pn−1 < 2g¯n and
therefore
∆Zn > ²
4g¯
1
n
Zn−1
Thus if βg¯ − 2α¯ > 0, then Zn →∞.
Alternatively, suppose that βg¯ − 2α¯ < −² < 0. Then for n suﬃciently large, we have β∆Pn − 2αn +
O
³
1
Pn
´
< − ²2 . In this case, applying Lemma 10 implies Zn → 0.
Proposition 9
Pn unbounded
Note that
³
1− αnPn
´2 → 1. Then, for arbitrary L > vmt, there exists some nL such that ³1− αnPn´2 >
1− vmt2L for all n ≥ nL. Define a new sequence yn by
yn =
(
γn if n < nL¡
1− vmt2L
¢
yn−1 + vmt if n ≥ nL
By construction, yn ≤ γn for all n ≥ 1. Furthermore, yn → 2L, so there exists some n0L such that yn > L for
all n ≥ n0L. So a fortiori, γn > L for all n ≥ n0L. Since L was arbitrary, this suﬃces to show that γn diverges.
Pn bounded
We use the following lemma adapted from Maxim Engers.
Lemma 11 Suppose {Fn}n≥1 is a sequence of functions (on a compact subset Z ⊆ <) that converges uni-
formly to a contraction mapping F . Let z¯ be the unique fixed point of F . For any initial z1 ∈ Z, define a
sequence {zn}n≥1 by zn = Fn (zn−1). Then {zn}n≥1 → z¯.
Suppose that Pn → N∗. Let Z = [vmt,N∗ (vc + vmt)] and define Fn : Z → Z by Fn (z) =
³
1− 1Pn zz+v
´2
z+³
1
Pn
z
z+v
´2
vc + vmt. Let F = limn→∞ Fn, so we have F (z) =
³
1− 1N∗ zz+v
´2
z +
³
1
N∗
z
z+v
´2
vc + vmt. (The
limits on Z are chosen so as to ensure that Fn (Z) ⊆ Z for all n ≥ 1, as well as for F .) It is straightforward
to see that Fn → F uniformly, and furthermore, we have the following.
Lemma 12 The function F , as defined above, is a contraction mapping.
Thus F has a unique fixed point z¯. We have γ1 = vc + vmt ∈ Z, and γn = Fn
¡γn−1¢ for n > 1, so by
Lemmas 11 and 12, {γn}n≥1 → z¯. Furthermore, because F (vmt) 6= vmt, we must have z¯ > vmt.
9 Supplementary Appendix
9.1 Proofs Omitted from the Main Appendix
Lemma 2 Suppose τ¯nRn → K, with η = 1Kv as in the text. Let Hn =
Pn
j=1
1
P 2j
if Pn is unbounded
and RnPn diverges, or Hn =
Pn
j=1
1
RjPj
otherwise. Then τ¯n−KRnHn → L, for some finite L. Furthermore,
Rn
Hn
(ηv − κnRn)→ L (ηv)2 and RnHn (η − αnRn)→ Lη2v.
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Proof. Write ∆τ¯n = τ¯n − τ¯n−1 and ∆Rn = Rn − Rn−1 = 1Pn . With an eye toward applying Corollary
3, we recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that ∆τ¯n and ∆Rn satisfy ∆τ¯n = Kn∆Rn = KnPn , where
Kn =
τ¯n − τ¯n−1
Rn −Rn−1 =
µ
2− 1
Pn
vc + κn−1
v + κn−1
¶µ τ¯n−1
vτ¯n−1 + 1−Mn
¶
with Kn → K. Then we can write ∆τ¯n −K∆Rn = (Kn −K)∆Rn = 1Pn (Kn −K). For ease of exposition,
separate Kn into K˜n = 2− 1Pn vc+κn−1v+κn−1 and Kˆn = τ¯n−1vτ¯n−1+1−Mn , with K˜n → K˜, Kˆn → Kˆ, and K = K˜Kˆ. We
can write Kn −K = K˜
³
DKˆ
´
+ Kˆ
³
DK˜
´
+
³
DK˜
´³
DKˆ
´
, where DK˜ = K˜n − K˜ and DKˆ = Kˆn − Kˆ. Let
hn =
1
P 2n
if RnPn diverges, or hn =
1
RnPn
otherwise. Consider the limit:
lim
n→∞
∆τ¯n −K∆Rn
hn
= lim
n→∞
K˜
³
DKˆ
´
+ Kˆ
³
DK˜
´
+
³
DK˜
´³
DKˆ
´
hnPn
Take the numerator term by term. Regardless of whether Pn is bounded, Kˆ = 1v . Thus, DKˆ =
τ¯n−1
vτ¯n−1+1−Mn −
1
v =
1
v
³
(Mn−1)
vτ¯n−1+(1−Mn)
´
. Both K˜ and Mn are bounded, so the limiting behavior of
K˜(DKˆ)
hnPn
is governed by
Pnτ¯n−1 (if Pn → ∞ and RnPn diverges) or Rnτ¯n−1 (otherwise). But τ¯n−1 grows at rate Rn, so
K˜(DKˆ)
hnPn
tends to
either zero (in the first case) or a positive constant (otherwise). Next, K˜ equals 2 − 1N∗ vcv or 2 depending
on whether or not Pn is bounded. If Pn is bounded, then we have
Kˆ(DK˜)
hnPn
= KˆRn
³
DK˜
´
, or, with some
algebra,− 1Pnv2Rn
³
vc
N∗−Pn
N∗ + κn−1 v−vcv+κn−1
´
. We have Rn (N∗ − Pn) → 0 (N∗ − Pn falls exponentially in
n, while Rn grows linearly in n) and Rnκn−1 tends to a constant, so this term has a finite limit. If Pn is
unbounded, then DK˜ = − 1Pn vc+κn−1v+κn−1 , and so
Kˆ(DK˜)
hnPn
tends to a nonzero constant if RnPn diverges or tends to
a constant. If RnPn tends to zero, then the dominant term of
Kˆ(DK˜)
hnPn
is proportional to RnPn , so
Kˆ(DK˜)
hnPn
tends to
zero as well. We omit the argument that limn→∞
(DK˜)(DKˆ)
hnPn
is finite, as it is very similar to the logic for the
other two terms. Thus limn→∞ ∆τ¯n−K∆Rnhn exists; call that limit L.
Next, apply Corollary 3. Define the strictly increasing sequence Hn =
Pn
j=1 hn. To show that Hn is
unbounded, first suppose that RnPn does not diverge. Then Hn =
Pn
j=1
1
RjPj
which diverges at rate lnRn
by Lemma 4. Alternatively, if Pn is unbounded and RnPn diverges, then Hn =
Pn
j=1
1
P2j
=
Pn
j=1
Rj
Pj
1
RjPj
.
In this case, the terms of
Pn
j=1
1
P2j
eventually dominate the terms of
Pn
j=1
1
RjPj
which we know to diverge.
Thus Hn diverges in the second case as well. Thus, Corollary 3 can be applied to ∆τ¯n−K∆Rnhn to arrive at
limn→∞ τ¯n−KRnHn → L.
The result that RnHn (ηv − κnRn)→ L (ηv)2 follows by using κnRn → K−1 = ηv. For the third result, use
the definition of αn to get RnHn (η − αnRn) = 1v RnHn (ηv − κnRn) + 1v (κn−1Rn)(αnRn)Hn − 1v ∆κnR
2
n
Hn
. The second
term tends to zero (since its numerator converges and its denominator diverges). For the third term, note that
∆κnR2n = ∆τn
³
Rnτn−1
´³
Rnτn
´
, with the terms in parentheses convergent and ∆τn bounded. Thus, 1v ∆κnR
2
n
Hn
tends to zero as well. The third result follows.
Lemma 3 RnPn ≥ n for all n ≥ 1.
Proof. R1P1 = 1, so this is satisfied for n = 1. For n > 1 we also have
RnPn −Rn−1Pn−1 = (Rn −Rn−1)Pn +Rn−1 (Pn − Pn−1)
= 1 +Rn−1 (Pn − Pn−1) ≥ 1 ,
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which suﬃces to prove the claim.
Lemma 4 (Discrete approximation of lnRn) Define Sn =
Pn
k=1
1
RkPk
. The sequence {Sn − lnRn}n≥1
converges.
Proof. Let Tn = Sn − lnRn, and ∆Tn = Tn − Tn−1 for n > 1. We have
∆Tn = 1
RnPn
+ ln
Rn−1
Rn
=
1
RnPn
+ ln
µ
1− 1
RnPn
¶
For n > 1, 1RnPn ∈ (0, 1), and the function x + ln (1− x) = −
³
x2
2 +
x3
3 +
x4
4 + ...
´
is strictly negative for
x ∈ (0, 1), so we have ∆Tn < 0.
Next, observe that we can equivalently write Tn as Tn =
³
1
RnPn
− lnR1
´
+
Pn−1
k=1
³
1
RkPk
− ln
³
Rk+1
Rk
´´
.
For the summand, we have
1
RkPk
− ln
µ
Rk+1
Rk
¶
=
1
RkPk
− ln
µ
1 +
1
RkPk+1
¶
≥ 1
RkPk
− ln
µ
1 +
1
RkPk
¶
> 0
where the second line uses Pk+1 ≥ Pk and the third line uses the fact that x− ln (1 + x) is strictly positive
for x > 0. Thus we have Tn > 1RnPn − lnR1 = 1RnPn > 0. But then, since Tn is decreasing and bounded
below, it must converge.
Lemma 5 (Linear approximation of ln (1− αn/Pn)) Define ck by ln (1− αk/Pk) = −αk/Pk + ck. For
arbitrary m > 1, the sum
P∞
k=m+1 ck converges.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that P∞k=m+1 |ck| converges. Write zk = αk/Pk, so ck = zk + ln (1− zk).
Observe that zk < 1 (because αk < 1 and Pk ≥ 1), that zk → 0 with k, and zkRkPk = αkRk → η, where η is
defined in the text. (This last limit follows from αkRk → 1v limk→∞ κkRk = η.) For all k suﬃciently large, we
have zk <
2η
RkPk
≤ 2ηn , by the convergence of zkRkPk and Lemma 3 respectively. Furthermore, the function
|z + ln (1− z)| is increasing on (0, 1), so we have |ck| < ¯¯2ηk + ln ¡1− 2ηk ¢¯¯ for k suﬃciently large. Thus, to
prove the lemma, it suﬃces to show thatP∞k=m+1 ¯¯2ηk + ln ¡1− 2ηk ¢¯¯ converges. This follows by applying the
Integral Test using the test function f (k) = 2ηk + ln
¡
1− 2ηk
¢
.
Lemma 6 For arbitrary m ≥ 1 and q ∈ (0, 1), the sum P∞k=m+1 1R2−qk Pk converges.
Proof. Note that R2−qk Pk →∞ by Lemma 3. Let ck = 1R2−qk Pk , so the sum of interest is
P∞
k=m+1 ck. For
the purpose of comparison, define c0k = R
q−1
k−1−Rq−1k . and observe that
P∞
k=m+1 c
0
k = R
q−1
m − limk→∞Rq−1k =
Rq−1m is convergent. Write R
q−1
k−1 =
³
Rk − 1Pk
´q−1
= Rq−1k
³
1− 1RkPk
´q−1
and take a binomial expansion to
get Rq−1k−1 = R
q−1
k
³
1 + 1−qRkPk + o
³
1
RkPk
´´
. Use this to write c0k as c
0
k =
1−q
R2−qk Pk
+ o
³
1
R2−qk Pk
´
. Comparing ck
to c0k, we have limk→∞ c0k/ck = 1− q, so the convergence of
P∞
k=m+1 ck is implied by the limit ratio test.
The next three lemmas support Proposition 5.
Lemma 7 κˆnρˆn is bounded.
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Proof. Write ∆
³ κˆnρˆn ´ = κˆnρˆn − κˆn−1ρˆn−1 = κˆn−1ρˆn ³ ∆κˆnκˆn−1 − ∆ρˆnρˆn−1´. We will show (i) that ∆³ κˆnρˆn ´ is negative if
κˆnρˆn is suﬃciently large, and (ii), ∆
³ κˆnρˆn ´ is bounded. This will suﬃce to show κˆnρˆn has an upper bound. For
(i), use the expressions above to write
∆
µ κˆn
ρˆn
¶
= − κˆn−1ρˆn
1
Pn
⎛
⎝
1
κ¯n−1+v
³
1
S κˆn−1 + S−1S
³
v
³
1− ρˆn−1κˆn−1
´
+ ρˆn−1
´´
−αˆn
³
2− 1Pn αˆnρˆn−1
¡
vc + ρˆn−1
¢´
⎞
⎠
< − κˆn−1ρˆn
1
Pn
µ
1
κ¯n−1 + v
µ
1
S
κˆn−1 + S − 1
S
µ
v
µ
1− ρˆn−1κˆn−1
¶
+ ρˆn−1
¶¶
− 2αˆn
¶
= − κˆn−1ρˆn
1
Pn
1
κ¯n−1 + v
µ
1
S
κˆn−1 + S − 1
S
µ
v
µ
1− ρˆn−1κˆn−1
¶
+ ρˆn−1
¶
− 2κ¯n−1
¶
= − κˆn−1ρˆn
1
Pn
1
κ¯n−1 + v
µ
S − 1
S
v
µ
1− ρˆn−1κˆn−1
¶
− κ¯n−1
¶
But κ¯n−1 tends to zero with n (since κˆn−1 and ρˆn−1 do). Pick any arbitrary L > 1 and εL = 12 S−1S v
¡
1− 1L
¢
.
There is some n∗ such that κ¯n−1 < εL for all n ≥ n∗. Then, for all n ≥ n∗, if κˆn−1ρˆn−1 > L, then ∆
³
κˆnρˆn
´
is
negative.
For (ii), note that S−1S v
³
1− ρˆn−1κˆn−1
´
−εL > −S−1S v ρˆn−1κˆn−1 , so for all n ≥ n∗, we have
³
S−1
S v
³
1− ρˆn−1κˆn−1
´
− κ¯n−1
´
>
−S−1S v ρˆn−1κˆn−1 and therefore
∆
µ κˆn
ρˆn
¶
<
κˆn−1
ρˆn
1
Pn
1
κ¯n−1 + v
µ
S − 1
S
v
ρˆn−1
κˆn−1
¶
=
ρˆn−1
ρˆn
1
Pn
v
κ¯n−1 + v
S − 1
S
Take n∗∗ ≥ n∗ large enough such that ρˆn−1ρˆn < 2 for all n ≥ n∗∗. (We can do this because
ρˆn−1
ρˆn =ρˆn−1
(1− αˆnPn )
2ρˆn−1+( αˆnPn )
2
vc
< 1
(1− αˆnPn )
2 which tends to 1 since aˆn → 0 and Pn ≥ 1.) Then we have ∆
³ κˆnρˆn ´ < 2S−1S
for all n ≥ n∗∗. Together, (i) and (ii) imply that for all n ≥ n∗, κˆn−1ρˆn−1 cannot exceed L+ 2S−1S . Thus,
κˆn−1
ρˆn−1
has a finite upper bound.
Lemma 8 1ρˆnRn is bounded. (That is, ρˆn tends to zero no faster than rate Rn.)
Proof. We proceed as in the proof of Proposition 2. Set up the ratio 1/ρˆnRn , where the increments of the
numerator and denominator are ∆
³
1
ρˆn
´
= 1ρˆn − 1ρˆn−1 = −
∆ρˆnρˆnρˆn−1 and ∆Rn = 1Pn . The proof of Theorem
1 can easily be extended to show that if the sequence
∆
³
1ρˆn
´
∆Rn has an upper bound, then
1/ρˆn
Rn
has an upper
bound as well. The sequence
∆
³
1
ρˆn
´
∆Rn is given by
∆
³
1
ρˆn
´
∆Rn =
ρˆn−1
ρˆn
αˆn
ρˆn−1
µ
2− 1
Pn
αˆn
ρˆn−1
¡ρˆn−1 + vc¢¶
We have αˆn < κ¯n−1 = 1S κˆn−1 + S−1S ρˆn−1, so αˆnρˆn−1 < 1S
κˆn−1
ρˆn−1 +
S−1
S . Since
κˆn−1
ρˆn−1 is bounded by Lemma 7,
αˆnρˆn−1 is as well. But then
ρˆn−1
ρˆn bounded, Pn ≥ 1, and ρˆn−1 → 0 imply that
∆
³
1ρˆn
´
∆Rn is bounded. Thus,
1
ρˆnRn
is bounded as claimed, and so ρˆn > CRn for some constant C.
Lemma 9 At least one of the following must hold: either κˆn−ρˆnρˆn → 0 or (κˆn − ρˆn)Rn → 0.
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Proof. We consider the limit of (κˆn − ρˆn)Rn = Rn1/(κˆn−ρˆn) . By Theorem 1, this limit is equal to
limn→∞ ∆Rn∆
³
1
κˆn−ρˆn
´ , where ∆³ 1κˆn−ρˆn´ = 1κˆn−ρˆn − 1κˆn−1−ρˆn−1 , if the latter limit exists. We have
∆Rn
∆
³
1
κˆn−ρˆn
´ = −¡κˆn−1 − ρˆn−1¢ (κˆn − ρˆn)
Pn (∆κˆn −∆ρˆn)
<
¡κˆn−1 − ρˆn−1¢ (κˆn − ρˆn)
κˆn−1 − αˆnv − 2αˆnρˆn−1
where the second line drops the term (αˆn/Pn)2 ¡ρˆn−1 + vc¢ from ∆ρˆn. Rearranging the denominator, using
the expressions for αˆn and κ¯n−1, we can write
κˆn−1 − αˆnv − 2αˆnρˆn−1 =
µ
S − 1
S
+
αˆn
S
¶¡κˆn−1 − ρˆn−1¢− αˆnρˆn−1
Using this in the inequality above, we have
∆Rn
∆
³
1
κˆn−ρˆn
´ < κˆn − ρˆn¡
S−1
S +
αˆn
S
¢− αˆnρˆn−1κˆn−1−ρˆn−1
The numerator on the righthand side tends to zero (because κˆn and ρˆn do). In the denominator,
¡
S−1
S +
αˆn
S
¢→
S−1
S . Thus, as long as
αˆnρˆn−1
κˆn−1−ρˆn−1 9
S−1
S , we have
∆Rn
∆
³
1
κˆn−ρˆn
´ → 0, which implies (κˆn − ρˆn)Rn → 0. Alter-
natively, consider the possibility that we do have
αˆnρˆn−1
κˆn−1−ρˆn−1 → S−1S . But together with αˆn → 0, this implies
that κˆn−ρˆnρˆn → 0.
Lemma 10 Define a sequence Zn by
Z1 = Zinit > 0
Zn = (1− bn−1)Zn−1 + cn−1 if n > 1
Write the increments of this sequence as ∆Zn ≡ Zn − Zn−1 = −bn−1
³
Zn−1 − cn−1bn−1
´
. Suppose that bn and
cn are sequences with 0 < bn < 1 and
P∞
n=1 bn divergent, cn → 0, and cnbn → Z ≥ 0. Then Zn → Z.
Proof. Define Yn = Zn − Z, so that Yn = (1− bn−1)Yn−1 + γn−1bn−1, where γn−1 = cn−1bn−1 − Z → 0.
Iterate forward to get
Yn = Y1
n−1Y
j=1
(1− bj) +
n−2X
j=1
⎛
⎝γjbj
n−1Y
k=j+1
(1− bk)
⎞
⎠+ γn−1bn−1
Define Sn =
Qn
j=1
1
1−bj for n ≥ 1, with S0 = 1. We can write
Yn =
Y1
Sn−1
+
1
Sn−1
n−1X
j=1
γjbjSj
Define ∆Sn = Sn − Sn−1, and observe that ∆Sn = bnSn, so we have
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Yn =
Y1
Sn−1
+
1
Sn−1
n−1X
j=1
γj∆Sj
We claim, deferring a proof for the moment, that Sn → ∞, so the first term above converges to zero.
Furthermore, we can apply Theorem 1 to the second term, yielding
lim
n→∞
Pn−1
j=1 γj∆Sj
Sn−1
= lim
n→∞
γn−1∆Sn−1
∆Sn−1
= lim
n→∞ γn−1 = 0
Thus, Yn → 0 and so Zn → Z.
Finally, to show that Sn →∞, note that lnSn = −Pnj=1 ln (1− bj). Because bj < 1, we have ln (1− bj) <
−bj , so lnSn >Pnj=1 bj . But the sum on the righthand side diverges by assumption, so we are done.
Lemma 11 Suppose {Fn}n≥1 is a sequence of functions (on a compact subset Z ⊆ <) that converges
uniformly to a contraction mapping F . Let z¯ be the unique fixed point of F . For any initial z1 ∈ Z, define a
sequence {zn}n≥1 by zn = Fn (zn−1). Then {zn}n≥1 → z¯.
Proof. For n ≥ 1, let ξn = |zn − z¯|. Then,
ξn = |Fn (zn−1)− z¯| ≤ |Fn (zn−1)− F (zn−1)|+ |F (zn−1)− z¯| ≤ εn + cξn−1
where c < 1 is the modulus of contraction and εn = supz∈Z |Fn (z)− F (z)|. Thus ξn ≤ εn + cξn−1, where
εn → 0 by the uniform convergence of {Fn}n≥1. Thus, ξn → 0.
Lemma 12 The function F : Z → Z, with Z = [vmt,N (vc + vmt)] and F (z) =
³
1− 1N zz+v
´2
z +³
1
N
z
z+v
´2
vc + vmt, is a contraction mapping.
Proof. Fix arbitrary y, z ∈ Z with y < z. Write αy = yy+v , αz = zz+v , α¯ = 12 (αy + αz), and δ = N −1 >
0. Set c1 = δvmtN2(vmt+v) < 1 and c2 =
1
2 .
F (z)− F (y) < (1− c1) (z − y)
We can write
F (z)− F (y) =
³
1− α¯
N
´2
(z − y) + vc
N2
¡α2z − α2y¢
+
µ³
1− αz
N
´2 − ³1− α¯
N
´2¶
z +
µ³
1− α¯
N
´2 − ³1− αy
N
´2¶
y
The last two terms are negative (because αz > α¯ > αy). For the second term, use αz−αy = v(y+v)(z+v) (z − y)
to get
vc
N2
¡α2z − α2y¢ = 2α¯N2 vcv(y + v) (z + v) (z − y) ≤ 2α¯N2 (1− αy) (1− αz) (z − y)
Consolidating, we have
F (z)− F (y) ≤
µ³
1− α¯
N
´2
+
2α¯
N2
(1− αy) (1− αz)
¶
(z − y)
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Expand the factor multiplying (z − y) on the righthand to get
1− 2 α¯
N
+
α¯2 + 2α¯ (1− αy) (1− αz)
N2
= 1− α¯
N2
(2N − (α¯+ 2 (1− αy) (1− αz)))
= 1− α¯
N2
µ
2N − 2 + ¡3α¯− 2α¯2¢+ 1
2
(αz − αy)2
¶
≤ 1− α¯
N2
(2δ)
≤ 1− 2δvmt
N2 (vmt + v)
< 1− c1
F (z)− F (y) > − (1− c2) (z − y)
If we define F˜ (γ) = F (γ) + γ, it suﬃces to show that F˜ (z) − F˜ (y) > c2 (z − y). For this, it suﬃces to
have F˜ 0 > c2. Diﬀerentiate F˜ to get
dF˜ (γ)
dγ = 1 +
³
1− α
N
´2
+ 2
³vcα
N2
− γ
N
³
1− α
N
´´ dα
dγ
≥ 1 +
³
1− α
N
´2 − 2 γ
N
³
1− α
N
´ dα
dγ
= 1 +
³
1− α
N
´2 − 2
N
³
1− α
N
´ γv
(γ + v2)
= 1 +
³
1− α
N
´2 − 2
N
³
1− α
N
´
α (1− α)
where α = γγ+v . Using α (1− α) ≤ 14 and N > 1, the negative term is bounded by −12 . Thus dF˜ (γ)dγ ≥
1
2 +
¡
1− αN
¢2
> 12 .
So to summarize, |F (z)− F (y)| < (1−min (c1, c2)) |z − y|, so F (γ) is a contraction mapping.
9.2 Results for the Non-uniform Exit Models in Section 6
9.2.1 Analysis for Section 6.1, Case 2: Gradual exit of the first cohort
The Equations of Motion
Denote the squared error in cohort n’s action by γn ≡ E
³
(xn − θ)2
´
. As in the text, the error in the
observation pool after cohort n acts is κn = E
³
(x¯n − θ)2
´
. We have γ1 = vc and the covariance of the
errors in x1 and xn is defined to be ρn ≡ E ((x1 − θ) (xn − θ)). By assumption, the observation pool evolves
according to
x¯n−1 = (1− wn−1)xn−1 + wn−1x1
so we have
κn−1 = (1− wn−1)2 γn−1 + 2wn−1 (1− wn−1) ρn−1 + w2n−1vc
An individual agent ni who observes x¯n−1 and sni chooses the optimal action
xni = αnsni + (1− αn) x¯n−1 , where αn = κn−1κn−1 + v
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Averaging over cohort n individuals, we have
xn = αnsn + (1− αn) x¯n−1 and γn = α2nvc + (1− αn)2 κn−1
With algebra, this reduces to
γn = αnv¯n
where v¯n = αnvc + (1− αn) v is a weighted average of the individual and cohort error variances. To charac-
terize the covariance term, write xn recursively as
xn = αnsn + (1− αn) (1− wn−1)xn−1 + (1− αn)wn−1x1
Then we can compute
ρn = E ((x1 − θ) (xn − θ))
= (1− αn) (1− wn−1) ρn−1 + (1− αn)wn−1vc
using the fact that γ1 = vc and sn is uncorrelated with the earlier errors. The equations for κn and ρn, along
with the expressions for γn and αn, and the exogenous sequence wn, characterize the evolution of the model.
We can substitute in to express the equations of motion as52:
κn = v¯nκn−1 + v (1− wn)
2 κn−1 + 2wn (1− wn) ρn + w2nvc (13)
ρn = vκn−1 + v
¡
(1− wn−1) ρn−1 + wn−1vc
¢
(14)
An informal derivation of the speed of learning
We focus on the case in which a < 32 , so learning is slow. Define sequences Zn = n
rκn and Z˜n = nr˜ρn.
A full proof of Result 1 would demonstrate that (for the correct exponents r and r˜), Zn and Z˜n converge to
strictly positive constants. In the analysis below, we assume that Zn and Z˜n converge for some (undetermined)
values of r and r˜ ∈ (0, 1). Then we use logic similar to Lemma 10 to derive necessary conditions that r and
r˜ must satisfy. This suﬃces to pin down their values.
Suppose that r and r˜ are such that Zn → Z > 0 and Z˜n → Z˜ > 0. The first step is to express Zn and
Z˜n in a form (using (13) and (14)) that allows us to appeal to Lemma 10. We have
Zn = (1−Bn−1)Zn−1 + Cn−1 and Z˜n =
³
1− B˜n−1
´
Z˜n−1 + C˜n−1
where
Bn−1 = 1−
µ
1− 1
n
¶−r
v¯n
v
(1− αn) (1− wn)2
Cn−1 = 2nr−r˜wn (1− wn) Z˜n + nrw2nvc
B˜n−1 = 1−
µ
1− 1
n
¶−r˜
(1− αn) (1− wn−1)
C˜n−1 = nr˜wn−1 (1− αn) vc
52For clarity, v¯n (which is bounded between vc and v) is left unsubstituted.
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Next, we claim that Bn−1 and B˜n−1 are bounded below by 1−rn and
1−r˜
n respectively, so
P∞
n=1Bn andP∞
n=1 B˜n diverge. To show this, note that 1 − αn ≥ n−1n . (This follows because κn−1 ≥ vcn−1 , since the
righthand side is the full information variance after n− 1 cohorts. Then use 1− αn = vκn−1+v ≥ (n−1)vvc+(n−1)v ≥
n−1
n (since vc ≤ v).) Then, because v¯nv ≤ 1, we have
Bn−1 ≥ 1−
µ
1− 1
n
¶1−r
and B˜n−1 ≥ 1−
µ
1− 1
n
¶1−r˜
For r ∈ (0, 1), the function f (x) = 1− (1− x)1−r is convex, so f (x) ≥ f (0)− f 0 (0)x = (1− r)x. Applied
to the expressions above, we have Bn−1 ≥ 1−rn and B˜n−1 ≥ 1−r˜n .
Next, we argue that Zn → Z implies that Cn−1/Bn−1 → Z. For this, write ∆Zn = Zn − Zn−1 =
Bn−1
³
Cn−1
Bn−1 − Zn−1
´
. If Cn−1/Bn−1 were to diverge or to tend toward a limit diﬀerent from Z, then the term
in parentheses would be bounded away from zero. Given the lower bound on Bn−1, this would contradict the
assumption that the partial sums of ∆Zn converge. For the same reason, Z˜n → Z˜ implies that C˜n−1/B˜n−1 →
Z˜.
Now consider the ratios Bn−1/Cn−1 and B˜n−1/C˜n−1. For the latter, we have
B˜n−1
C˜n−1
=
1− ¡1− 1n¢−r˜ (1− αn) (1− wn−1)
nr˜wn−1 (1− αn) vc
=
− r˜n + αn + wn−1 + [2nd order terms in n−1,αn, and wn−1]
nr˜wn−1 (1− αn) vc so
lim
n→∞
B˜n−1
C˜n−1
=
1
vc
lim
n→∞
¡−r˜na−r˜−1 + αnna−r˜ + n−r˜¢
using wn−1 = n−a + o (n−a). Write the middle term as αnna−r˜ = αnκn−1Zn−1
³
n
n−1
´r
na−r˜−r so we have
lim
n→∞
B˜n−1
C˜n−1
= Z˜−1 = − r˜
vc
lim
n→∞
¡
na−r˜−1
¢
+
Z
vvc
lim
n→∞n
a−r˜−r
This relationship can only hold with r, r˜ ∈ (0, 1) and Z˜−1 positive and finite if a − r˜ − r = 0. In this case,
the first term vanishes, and we have Z˜−1 = Zvvc . Note that the constraint that r + r˜ = a implies that r˜ < a.
Next turn to Bn−1/Cn−1. Note that v¯nv = 1−
¡
1− vcv
¢αn, so we have
Bn−1
Cn−1
=
1− ¡1− 1n¢−r v¯nv (1− αn) (1− wn)2
2nr−r˜wn (1− wn) Z˜n + nrw2nvc
=
− rn +
¡
2− vcv
¢αn + 2wn + [2nd order terms]
nr−r˜wn
³
2 (1− wn) Z˜n + wnnr˜vc
´
The constraint that r˜ < a gives us wnnr˜ → 0 (the last term in the denominator), so
lim
n→∞
Bn−1
Cn−1
=
1
2Z˜
lim
n→∞
− rn +
¡
2− vcv
¢αn + 2wn
nr−r˜wn
=
1
2Z˜
³
−r lim
n→∞n
a+r˜−r−1 +
³
2− vc
v
´
lim
n→∞αnn
a+r˜−r + 2 lim
n→∞n
r˜−r´
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For the middle term, substitute to get αnna+r˜−r = αnκn−1Zn−1
³
n
n−1
´r
na+r˜−2r. Thus we have
lim
n→∞
Bn−1
Cn−1
= Z−1 = 1
2Z˜
Ã
−r lim
n→∞n
a+r˜−r−1 +
¡
2− vcv
¢
Z
v
lim
n→∞n
a+r˜−2r + 2 lim
n→∞n
r˜−r
!
Because r < 1, the exponents in the first two terms satisfy a+ r˜− r− 1 < a+ r˜− 2r. For this relationship to
hold with Z−1 > 0, we must have either [a+ r˜− 2r = 0 and r˜− r ≤ 0], or [a+ r˜− 2r ≤ 0 and r˜− r = 0]. The
second pair of constraints will not work (as it would imply that r = r˜ > a). If the first pair of constraints
holds, then we will have Z−1 = (2−
vc
v )Z
2Z˜v
, or Z =
q
2Z˜v
2− vcv .
In summary, convergence of κn and ρn to zero at rates nr and nr˜ is consistent only if the following
conditions hold
a− r˜ − r = 0
a+ r˜ − 2r = 0
r˜ − r ≤ 0
Solving these conditions yields the following rates:
r =
2
3
a and r˜ =
1
3
a
Notice that r → 1 as a → 32 . This suggests that learning is no slower than rate n1 for a ≥ 32 , and
therefore, the second part of Result 1 (because learning cannot be faster than rate n1). The semi-rigorous
approach above could be applied to the a ≥ 32 case with a bit more legwork.
9.2.2 Analysis for Section 6.2: Hyperbolic exit
Equations of motion
From the equations for yn and x¯n, it is straightforward to derive the following.
ωn =
³αn
n
´2
+
µ
1− 1
n
¶2
ωn−1 +
µ
1− αn
n
¶2
vn−1 + 2
1
n
µ
1− 1
n
¶
(1− αn) ρn−1 (15)
vn = (αnβ)2 + (1− β)2 ωn−1 + β2 (1− αn)2 vn−1 + 2β (1− β) (1− αn) ρn−1 (16)
ρn = α
2
nβ
n
+ (1− β)
µ
1− 1
n
¶
ωn−1 + β
n
(1− αn)2 vn−1 (17)
+(1− αn)
µµ
1− 1
n
¶
β + (1− β) 1
n
¶
ρn−1
αn = vn−1
1 + vn−1
Proof of Proposition 10
If β = 1, so that each agent observes her immediate predecessor, then action xn will be the eﬃcient
weighting of the first n signals, as discussed in Section 3.1, and the squared error in yn = xn will be νn = 1n .
In this case, the population average action x¯n and the covariance ρn are not particularly germane to the
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learning process, but for completeness, we discuss x¯n:
x¯n =
1
n
nX
j=1
nX
m=j
sj
m
, so ωn = 1
n2
nX
j=1
⎛
⎝
nX
m=j
1
m
⎞
⎠
2
By standard approximation methods, we can show that the summation grows as 2n (plus lower order terms),
so ωn also converges to zero at rate n.
If β < 1, then the system of diﬀerence equations can be written
∆ωn = − 2
n
ωn−1 + 2
n
ρn−1 − 2nρn−1vn−1 +O
³ωn−1
n2
´
+O
µω3n−1
n
¶
∆vn = (1− β)2 ωn−1 − ¡1− β2¢ vn−1 + 2β (1− β) ρn−1 − β2v2n−1 − 2β (1− β) ρn−1vn−1 +O ¡ω3n−1¢
∆ρn = (1− β)
µ
1− 1
n
¶
ωn−1 + β 1
n
vn−1 −
µβ
n
+ (1− β)
µ
1− 1
n
¶¶
ρn−1
−β v
2
n−1
n
−
µ
β + (1− 2β) 1
n
¶
ρn−1vn−1 + βρn−1v2n−1 +O
µω3n−1
n
¶
where we have used the facts that νn ≤ ωn and ρn ≤ ωn in consolidating the “big O” terms. As an overview
of the proof, notice that lowest order terms of ∆ωn can be written as ∆ωn ≈ − 2n
¡ωn−1 − ρn−1 + ρn−1νn−1¢.
By assumption, ρn−1νn−1 shrinks at rate R2n; we will show that ωn−1 − ρn−1 does as well. Then we have
∆ωn ∝ − 1nR2n ∝ −
ω2n−1
n , which is similar to the standard version of model PA with no exit. As earlier, this
generates a logarithmic rate of decrease in ωn.
Now we proceed with the formal proof. Note that for any a, we have rn(a)Rn(a) → 0. For brevity, we will
drop the argument to rn (a) and Rn (a) in most of what follows; Rn should always be interpreted to be the
rate at which (by hypothesis) ωn, νn, and ρn converge. We define ω˜n = Rnωn → ω˜, ν˜n = Rnνn → ν˜,
and ρ˜n = Rnρn → ρ˜ for some strictly positive ω˜, ν˜, and ρ˜. Next, define zn = ωn − ρn, and observing that
∆ρn = (1− β)
¡ωn−1 − ρn−1¢− βρn−1νn−1 +O ¡ωn−1n ¢+O ¡ω3n−1¢, we can write
zn − zn−1 = ∆ωn −∆ρn
= (1− β) ¡ρn−1 − ωn−1¢+ βρn−1νn−1 +O ³ωn−1n ´+O ¡ω3n−1¢
= − (1− β) zn−1 + βρn−1νn−1 +O
³ωn−1
n
´
+O
¡ω3n−1¢
Rearranging and multiplying both sides by R2n−1, we have
R2n−1zn − βR2n−1zn−1 = βR2n−1ρn−1νn−1 +O
µ
R2n−1ωn−1
n
¶
+O
¡
R2n−1ω3n−1
¢
, or
R2nzn
Ã
1− 2Rn−1
Rn
rn
Rn
−
µ
rn
Rn
¶2!
− βR2n−1zn−1 = βρ˜n−1ν˜n−1 +O
µ
Rn−1
n
ω˜n−1
¶
+O
¡ω˜2n−1ωn−1¢
Taking limits on both sides yields
(1− β) lim
n→∞R
2
nzn = βρ˜ν˜ +K
where K is a placeholder for the limit of the O
³
Rn−1
n ω˜n−1
´
terms. If Rnn → 0, as we will show to be true
shortly, then K must be zero. Notice that this implies that ω˜n − ρ˜n = Rnzn → 0.
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Next turn back to the equation of motion for ω˜n.
∆ω˜n = Rnωn −Rn−1ωn−1
= Rn−1∆ωn + rnωn−1 + rn∆ωn
Since the sum
Pn
m=2
1
m lnm diverges in n, the convergence of ω˜n to ω˜ > 0 implies that if the expression
ωˆn = (n lnn)∆ω˜n converges, it must converge to 0. Using the expression above for ∆ω˜n, we compute the
constituent pieces of ωˆn = An +Bn + Cn as follows:
An ≡ (n lnn)Rn−1∆ωn = −2 lnn
Rn−1
¡
Rn−1
¡ω˜n−1 − ρ˜n−1¢+ ρ˜n−1v˜n−1¢+Oµ lnnn ω˜n−1
¶
+O
µ
ω˜3n−1 lnnR2n−1
¶
Bn ≡ (n lnn) rnωn−1 = (n lnn) rn
Rn−1
ω˜n−1
Cn ≡ (n lnn) rn∆ωn = rn
Rn−1
An
Consider the following possibilities for a:
a > 0
Then nrn and Rnlnn diverge. For term An,
lnn
Rn
→ 0 and ω˜n−1 → ω˜ imply that the two O () terms converge
to zero. For the first term, recall that Rn−1
¡ω˜n−1 − ρ˜n−1¢ = R2n−1zn−1, which was shown to converge, and
ρ˜n−1v˜n−1 → ρ˜ν˜. Thus, lnnRn → 0 implies that limn→∞An = 0 (and therefore, limn→∞Cn = 0). Next consider
Bn. We have nrnRn−1 → a, so Bn diverges, and therefore ωˆn → ∞, contradicting the convergence of ω˜. Thus,
ωn, νn, and ρn do not converge to zero at any polynomial rate in n.
a = 0
In this case nrn → 1 and Rnlnn → 1. For term An, as above, the two higher order terms vanish as n→∞,
so we have
lim
n→∞An = −2
³
lim
n→∞Rn−1
¡ω˜n−1 − ρ˜n−1¢+ ρ˜ν˜´ = − 21− β ρ˜ν˜ ,
lim
n→∞Bn = ω˜ , and
lim
n→∞Cn = 0
This implies (n lnn)∆ω˜n → ω˜ − 21−β ρ˜ν˜. This is consistent with the convergence of ω˜n if ω˜ = 21−β ρ˜ν˜, or
equivalently, since we have already shown that ω˜n − ρ˜n → ω˜ − ρ˜ = 0, if ν˜ = 1−β2 . Thus, if ωn, νn, and ρn all
converge to zero at common rate Rn, it is possible that Rn could grow as lnn.
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